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Abstract 
 
The Panic of 2007-2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the “repo” market), 
which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization 
activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with 
securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized 
banking”, and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set 
that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of crisis from 
subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that 
changes in the “LIB-OIS” spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with 
changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds.  These changes implied higher 
uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the 
liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo “haircuts”: the 
amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and 
increasing haircuts, the U.S. banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the 
Great Depression. 
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The 2007-2008 financial crisis was a system-wide bank run.  What makes this bank run 
special is that it did not occur in the traditional-banking system, but instead took place in the 
“securitized-banking” system.  A traditional-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of deposits, 
while a securitized-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of repurchase (“repo”) agreements.  
Hence, we describe the crisis as a “run on repo”.  The purpose of this paper is to propose a 
mechanism for this new kind of bank run, and to provide supporting evidence for this mechanism 
through analysis of two novel data sets.  
Traditional banking is the business of making and holding loans, with insured demand 
deposits as the main source of funds. Securitized banking is the business of packaging and 
reselling loans, with repo agreements as the main source of funds. Securitized-banking activities 
were central to the operations of firms formerly known as “investment banks” (e.g. Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch), but they also play a role at commercial 
banks, as a supplement to traditional-banking activities of firms like Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and 
Bank of America.
1 
We argue that the financial crisis that began in August 2007 was a “systemic event,” defined 
in this paper to mean that the banking sector became insolvent, in the sense that it could not pay 
off its debt. What happened is analogous to the banking panics of the 19
th century in which 
depositors en masse went to their banks seeking to withdraw cash in exchange for demand and 
savings deposits.  The banking system could not honor these demands because the cash had been 
lent out and the loans were illiquid, so instead they suspended convertibility and relied on 
clearinghouses to issue certificates as makeshift currency.
2 Evidence of the insolvency of the 
banking system (i.e., that the system cannot pay off the demand deposits, as demanded by 
depositors) in these earlier episodes is the discount on these certificates.  We argue that the 
current crisis is similar in that contagion led to “withdrawals” in the form of unprecedented high 
repo haircuts and even the cessation of repo lending on many forms of collateral. Evidence of 
                                                        
1 We have chosen a new term, “securitized banking”, to emphasize the role of the securitization process both as the 
main intermediation activity and as a crucial source of the collateral used to raise funds in repo transactions.  Other 
banking terms – “wholesale banking”, “shadow banking”, or “investment banking” – have broader connotations and 
do not completely encompass our definition of securitized banking.  The closest notion to our definition of 
securitized banking is the model of “unstable banking” proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (2009). 
2 The clearinghouse private money was a claim on the coalition of banks, rather than a liability of any individual 
bank.  By broadening the backing for the claim, the clearinghouse made the claim safer, a kind of insurance. Gorton 
(1985) and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) discuss the clearinghouse response to panics.  Also, see Gorton and 
Huang (2006). Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752
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insolvency in 2008 is the bankruptcy or forced rescue of several large firms, with other (even 
larger) firms requiring government support to stay in business. 
To perform our analysis, we use two novel data sets, one with information on 392 securitized 
bonds and related assets, including many classes of asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized-
debt obligations (CDOs), credit-default swaps (CDS); the other data set contains repo rates, and 
repo haircuts.
3 Using these data, we are able to provide a new perspective on the contagion in 
this crisis. In our exposition, we use this term “contagion” specifically to mean the spread of the 
crisis from subprime-housing assets to non-subprime assets that have no direct connection to the 
housing market.  In fact, we argue that to explain the crisis requires explaining why the spreads 
on non-subprime related asset classes rose dramatically. 
To provide background for our analysis, we illustrate the differences between traditional 
banking and securitized banking in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 provides the classic picture of the 
financial intermediation of mortgages by the traditional-banking system.  In Step A, depositors 
transfer money to the bank, in return for a checking or savings account that can be withdrawn at 
any time.  In Step B, the bank loans these funds to a borrower, who promises to repay through a 
mortgage on the property. The bank then holds this mortgage on its balance sheet, along with 
other non-mortgage loans made to retail and commercial borrowers.   
Traditional-banking runs, for the most part, were ended in United States after the Great 
Depression, owing to a combination of influences, including enhanced discount-window lending 
by the Federal Reserve and the introduction of deposit insurance.  Deposit insurance removes 
any incentive for insured depositors to withdraw their funds, but larger insured banks cannot 
offer insured depositors to non-retail depositors (including sovereign wealth funds, mutual funds, 
and cash-rich companies). One solution to this problem is the securitized-banking system 
illustrated in Figure 2, which takes large “deposits” from investors (Step 1), and then 
intermediates these deposits to mortgage borrowers (Steps 2 and 3) and other debtors.   
Step 1 in Figure 2 is an analogue to Step A from Figure 1, but there is one important 
difference.  In the traditional-banking system shown in Figure 1, the deposits are insured by the 
government. To achieve similar protection in Step 1 of Figure 2, the investor receives collateral 
from the bank.  In practice, this deposit-collateral transaction takes the form of a repo agreement: 
                                                        
3 This paper uses many terms and abbreviations that are atypical or new to the academic literature. Beginning in 
Section I, the first appearance of these terms is given in bold type, and definitions of bolded terms are given in 
Appendix A.   3 
 
 
the investor “buys” some asset (i.e., the collateral) from the bank for $X, and the bank agrees to 
repurchase the same asset some time later (perhaps the next day) for $Y.  The percentage (Y-
X)/X is the “repo rate”, and is analogous to the interest rate on a bank deposit.  Typically, the 
total amount of the deposit will be some amount less than the value of the underlying asset, with 
the difference called a “haircut”.  For example, if an asset has a market value of $100 and a bank 
sells it for $80 with an agreement to repurchase it for $88, then we would say that the repo rate is 
10 percent (= 88-80 / 80), and the haircut is 20 percent (100 – 80 / 100).  If the bank defaults on 
the promise to repurchase the collateral, then the investor has the right to terminate the 
agreement and keep or sell the collateral.  
Turning next to the lower right corner of Figure 2, we show how the second part of the 
intermediation differs from traditional banking.  In Figure 1, the bank did the work of 
underwriting the loan itself.  In Figure 2, the bank outsources this function to a direct lender. 
Such lenders grew to prominence in the most recent housing boom, with a specialization of 
underwriting loans to be held for only a short time before being sold to banks. Much has been 
written about potential conflicts in this separation of the loan decision from the source of finance, 
but that is not our topic here.  In principle, there is no reason that this separation must necessarily 
lead to poor underwriting, and in any event such problems do not imply anything about 
contagion or systemic events. 
Another key component of securitized banking is in the “securitization” itself: the 
intermediation activities that transfer most of the mortgage loans to outside investors in Step 4.  
We will discuss this step in detail in Section I of the paper. For our purposes here, the key idea is 
that the outputs of this securitization are often used as collateral in Step 1, so that securitized 
banking is a cycle that requires all steps to keep running.  In this paper, we will show how this 
cycle broke down in the crisis. 
Figure 3 summarizes the relationships between the main elements of traditional and 
securitized banking.  The left column lists the familiar elements of traditional banking: reserves, 
deposit insurance, interest rates on deposits, and the holding of loans on balance sheet.  Bank 
solvency is promoted by requiring a fraction of deposits to be held in reserve, and in emergencies 
these reserves can be replenished by borrowing from the central bank. The analogue in 
securitized banking is the repo haircut, which forces banks to keep some fraction of their assets 
in reserve when they borrow money through repo markets. The next row, deposit insurance, is a 4 
 
 
promise made by the government to pay depositors in the event of default.  The analogue in 
securitized banking is collateral.  Next, a bank in need of cash can raise deposit rates to attract it; 
the analogues for securitized banking are the repo rates.  Finally, the cash raised in traditional 
banking is lent out, with the resulting loans held on the balance sheet.  In securitized banking, 
funds are lent only temporarily, with loans repackaged and resold as securitized bonds.  Some of 
these bonds are also used as collateral to raise more funds, which completes the cycle. 
The “run on repo” can be seen in Figure 4, which plots a “haircut index” from 2007 to 2008.  
The details of this index will be explained below in Section III; for now, just think of the index 
as an average haircut for collateral used in repo transactions, not including U.S. treasury 
securities.  This index rises from zero in early 2007 to nearly 50 percent at the peak of the crisis 
in late 2008. During this time period, several classes of assets stopped entirely from being used 
as collateral, an unprecedented event that is equivalent to a haircut of 100 percent.  
To see how the increase in haircuts can drive the banking system to insolvency, take as a 
benchmark a repo market size of, for example, $10 trillion. With zero haircuts, this is the amount 
of financing that banks can achieve in the repo markets.  When the weighted-average haircut 
reaches, say, 20 percent, then banks have a shortage of $2 trillion. In the crisis, some of this 
amount was raised early on by issuing new securities. But, this fell far short of what was needed. 
Furthermore, selling the underlying collateral drives asset prices down, which then reinforces the 
cycle: lower prices, less collateral, more concerns about solvency, and ever increasing haircuts. 
In addition to repo, other short-term debt also experienced runs.  There were runs, in 
particular, on asset-backed commercial paper programs and structured investment vehicles.   
Papers that document the runs on asset-backed commercial paper programs during the crisis 
include Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009) and Carey, Correa, and Kotter (2009).  Aside from 
asset-backed commercial paper, the commercial paper of financial firms, the predominant issuers 
of corporate short-term commercial paper also saw withdrawals when investors refused to 
reinvest as the paper came due; see Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010).
4  Also, important was the 
run on money market funds following the failure of Lehman Brothers, as documented by The 
Investment Company Institute (2009).  In summary, all short-term debt markets were vulnerable 
during the crisis.  In this paper, we focus on the repo market because of its large size (discussed 
                                                        
4 The crises and other problems in the corporate commercial paper market were reminiscent of early crises in these 
markets; see Calomiris (1994) and Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995). 5 
 
 
below).  Also, repo is secured by collateral that can be reused (“rehypothecated”), which means 
that a depositor of cash in the bank takes physical possession of bond collateral and then can 
reuse that the collateral. So, the collateral has a “money multiplier.” When haircuts rise, the 
money multiplier works in reverse, causing a massive deleveraging process. This does not 
happen for unsecured short-term debt. 
This paper and those mentioned above, are part of a rapidly growing literature that tries to 
empirically document what happened during the crisis.  Aside from runs the financial crisis is 
complicated in many other dimensions as well. There are studies of the breakdown of various 
arbitrage relationships, perhaps due to counterparty risk and attendant funding problems, e.g., 
Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009), Gorton (2010), Baba and Packer (2009), Stanton and Wallace 
(2009), Fontana (2009), and Fender and Scheicher (2009).  Other research looks at counterparty 
risk and liquidity, e.g., Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2009), Schwarz (2009), and Singh and 
Aitken (2009).  There are also papers that document the international dimensions of the crisis, 
and compare the crisis to previous crises, e.g., Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic, and Sarno 
(2009) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).  Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) look at bank lending 
during the crisis.  The real effects of the crisis are also important to document, e.g., Almeida, 
Campello, and Laranjeira (2009) or Campello, Giabona, Graham, and Harvey (2009).  Many 
other papers look at subprime mortgages, rating agencies, auction rate securities, short selling 
prohibitions, and so on, so the above list is very far from being complete.
5 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we provide institutional 
background for our analysis, with a discussion of the growth of securitized banking, using 
subprime mortgages as the case study.  We use this case study to provide more detail for Step 4 
in Figure 2, and to explain the mechanics of securitization and the repo market. 
In Section II, we introduce and explain the two main state variables used in the paper: the 
ABX index – which proxies for fundamentals in the subprime mortgage market – and the LIB-
OIS, which is the spread between the LIBOR rate (for unsecured interbank borrowing) and the 
rate on an overnight interest swap, OIS (a proxy for the risk-free rate).  As we will discuss 
below, in our analysis the LIB-OIS spread acts primarily as a proxy for counterparty risk in the 
banking system.  We then plot these state variables for 2007 and 2008 and review the timeline 
                                                        
5 There is also a growing theory literature. Some examples are Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009), 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Geanakoplos (2010), Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2010a,b), He and Xiong 
(2009), Pagano and Volpin (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (2009), and Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden (2010). 6 
 
 
for the crisis. The ABX data show that the deterioration of the subprime market began in early 
2007. As is now well known, this deterioration had a direct impact on banks, which had many of 
these securitized assets and pre-securitized mortgages on their balance sheets.  This real 
deterioration in bank balance sheets became apparent in the interbank markets in mid-2007, as 
evidenced by an upward spike in the LIB-OIS in August.  This state variable remained in a 
historically high but narrow range until September 2008, when the events at Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, Lehman, and AIG led to a rapid deterioration in interbank markets and increase in the LIB-
OIS spread that persisted until the end of 2008.    
We posit that the increased risk at banks had several interrelated effects, all of which 
centered on the securitized assets used as collateral in the repo market.  We provide evidence for 
these effects, using a data set with information on securitized bonds, credit-default swaps, and 
other assets used in repo transactions.  These data were created by large financial institutions and 
are used for trading and portfolio valuation by a wide range of market participants.  Section III 
provides summary statistics on these data and illustrates how some of these assets co-moved with 
the ABX and the LIB-OIS.  
Section IV gives the main empirical results of the paper. Without a structural model of repo 
markets, we are only able to talk about co-movement of spreads on various assets, and thus we 
use the language of “correlation” rather than “causation” in our empirical analysis. Section IV.A 
explains our methodology and presents results for a few representative asset classes. Section 
IV.B uses the full set of asset classes to demonstrate that it was the interbank markets (LIB-OIS), 
and not the subprime housing market (ABX), that was correlated with increases in the spreads on 
non-subprime securitized assets and related derivatives.  These increased spreads are equivalent 
to a price decrease, which represents a fall in the value of collateral used in repo transactions. 
Then, as lenders began to fear for the stability of the banks and the possibility that they might 
need to seize and sell collateral, the borrowers were forced to raise repo rates and haircuts. Both 
of these increases occurred in the crisis. In Sections IV.C and IV.D, we find that these increases 
were correlated with changes in the LIB-OIS (for repo rates) and changes in the (expected 
future) volatility of the underlying collateral (for repo haircuts), consistent with the model of 
Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010).  It is the rise in haircuts that constitutes the run on repo.  
An increase in a haircut is tantamount to a withdrawal from the bank, forcing deleveraging on a 7 
 
 
large scale.  Section IV.E. uses data from Schwarz (2009) to confirm that the LIB-OIS 
relationships found for credit spreads and repo rates is primarily driven by counterparty risk. 
Section V reviews our arguments and concludes the paper.  Appendix A defines some of the 
paper’s terminology that may be unfamiliar for some readers, and also includes descriptions for 
each of the asset classes of securitized bonds that are used in our empirical analysis. Appendix B 
gives more detail on the data construction. 
 
I.  Institutional Background 
This section discusses the main institutional features that intersected in the crisis: the 
subprime mortgage market (Section I.A), securitization (Section I.B), and repo finance (Section 
I.C). 
 
A.  The Subprime Mortgage Market 
The opportunity for home ownership for all Americans has been a long-standing national 
goal. This goal was behind the origins of modern housing finance during the Great Depression 
with the New Deal’s National Housing Act of 1934 (see, e.g., Fishback, Horrace and Kantor 
(2001)).  For example, as President Bush put it in 2004: “Not enough minorities own their own 
homes.  … One thing I’ve done is I’ve called on private sector mortgage banks and banks to be 
more aggressive about lending to first-time home buyers.” 
6 The private sector responded. 
The subprime mortgage market is a financial innovation, aimed at providing housing finance 
to (disproportionately poor and minority) people with some combination of spotty credit 
histories, a lack of income documentation, or no money for a down payment.  Historically, this 
group was perceived by banks as too risky to qualify for the usual mortgage products, for 
example, a 30-year fixed rate mortgage. As explained by Gorton (2010), the innovation was to 
structure the mortgage to effectively make the maturity two or three years. This was 
accomplished with a fixed initial-period interest rate, but then at the “reset date” having the rate 
rise significantly, essentially requiring the borrower to refinance the mortgage. With rising home 
prices, borrowers would build equity in their homes and would be able to refinance.  
                                                        
6 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040326-15.html . 8 
 
 
The innovation was a success, if measured in terms of originations. In the years 2001-2006, a 
total of about $2.5 trillion of subprime mortgages were originated.
7  Almost half of this total 
came in 2005 and 2006, a large portion of which was likely refinancings of previous mortgages. 
 
B.  Securitization 
An important part of the subprime mortgage innovation was how the mortgages were 
financed.  In 2005 and 2006, about 80 percent of the subprime mortgages were financed via 
securitization, that is, the mortgages were sold in residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), which involves pooling thousands of mortgages together, selling the pool to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) which finances their purchase by issuing investment-grade securities 
(i.e., bonds with ratings in the categories of AAA, AA, A, BBB) with different seniority (called 
“tranches”) in the capital markets. Securitization does not involve public issuance of equity in 
the SPV. SPVs are bankruptcy remote in the sense that the originator of the underlying loans 
cannot claw back those assets if the originator goes bankrupt.  Also, the SPV is designed so that 
it cannot go bankrupt.
8   
RMBS are the largest component of the broader market for asset-backed securities (ABS), 
which includes similar structures for student loans, credit-card receivables, equipment loans, and 
many others. Figure 5 shows the annual issuance of debt in the important fixed income markets 
in the U.S. The figure shows that: (1) the mortgage-related market is by far the largest fixed-
income market in the U.S., by issuance; but further, (2), that restricting attention to non-
mortgage instruments, the asset-backed securitization market is very large, exceeding the 
issuance of all corporate debt in the U.S. in 2004, 2005, and 2006.  Overall, the figure shows that 
securitization is a very large, significant, part of U.S. capital markets.  
Securitization spawned a large number of new financial instruments and new usages for old 
instruments. Among these are asset-backed securities (ABS), credit default swaps (CDS), 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
9 Credit 
default swaps are derivative contracts under which one party insures another party against a loss 
due to default with reference to a specific corporate entity, asset-backed security, or index. For 
                                                        
7 See Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2007 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Key Data (2006), Joint Economic 
Committee (October 2007). 
8 On the process of securitization generally, see Gorton and Souleles (2006).  
9 Other innovations, like structured investment vehicles, synthetic CDOs, and so on, are discussed in Gorton (2010).  
Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) discuss loan sales by banks. 9 
 
 
our purposes, the CDS spread, which is the fixed coupon paid by the party buying the protection, 
is an indication of the risk premium with regard to the specified corporate entity. CDOs are 
securitizations of corporate bonds or asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities. CLOs are 
securitizations of loans to corporations. CDOs are relevant here for two reasons. First, the 
underlying CDO portfolios contained tranches of subprime securitizations, making their value 
sensitive to subprime risk. And second, like asset-backed securities generally, they too depend on 
the repo market, at least to some extent. 
Figure 6 shows how the pieces of the securitization process fit together.  This figure is an 
expansion of Step 4 from the securitized-banking diagram shown in Figure 2, and also includes 
Step 1 from Figure 2, while omitting Steps 2 and 3.  The starting point is a bank with a set of 
loans in its “inventory”.  The bank does not have the resources to keep all of these loans on its 
balance sheet – in securitized-banking the profit comes from the intermediation, not from 
holding the loans. In Step 4, these loans are transferred to the SPV and placed in one big pool.  
This pool is the assets of the SPV, which builds a capital structure on those assets using different 
layers, called tranches. The idea here is that the first losses on the pool will be allocated to the 
equity layer at the bottom, with additional losses moving up the capital structure, by seniority, 
until they reach the AAA tranche at the top.  These layers and rating are represented by the asset-
backed securities (ABS) issued by the SPV.  Since the assets backing these securities are 
mortgages, the ABS goes by the specialized name of residential-mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS) in this case.  
The ABS may be sold directly to investors (Step 5), or may instead be securitized in a CDO 
(Step 6).  A CDO will have a tranche structure similar to an ABS. The tranches of the CDO may 
be sold directly to investors (Step 7), or resecuritized into further levels of CDOs (not shown in 
figure).  In some cases, the ABS or CDO tranches may return to the balance sheets of the banks, 
where they may be used as collateral in the repo transaction of Step 1.    
With each level of securitization, the SPV often combines many lower-rated (BBB, BBB-) 
tranches into a new vehicle that has mostly AAA and AA rated tranches, a process that relies on 
well-behaved default models. This slicing and recombining is driven by a strong demand for 
highly rated securities for use as investments and collateral: essentially, there is not enough AAA 
debt in the world to satisfy demand, so the banking system set out to manufacture the supply. As 
emphasized by Gorton (2010), it can be very difficult to pierce the veil of a CDO and learn 10 
 
 
exactly what lies behind each tranche. This opacity was a fundamental part of pre-crisis 
securitization, and was not limited to subprime-based assets.
10 
C.  The Repo Market 
A repurchase agreement (or “repo”) is a financial contract used by market participants as a 
financing method to meet short-term liquidity needs.
11 A repurchase agreement is a two-part 
transaction. The first part is the transfer of specified securities by one party, the “bank” or 
“borrower,” to another party, the “depositor” or “lender,” in exchange for cash: the depositor 
holds the bond, and the bank holds the cash. 12 The second part of the transaction consists of a 
contemporaneous agreement by the bank to repurchase the securities at the original price, plus an 
agreed upon additional amount on a specified future date.  It is important to note that repurchase 
agreements, like derivatives, do not end up in bankruptcy court if one party defaults. The non-
defaulting party has the option to simply walk away from the transaction, keeping either the cash 
or the bonds.
13 
In the last thirty years, the demand for repo has grown enormously.  The main reason is 
the rapid growth of money under management by institutional investors, pension funds, mutual 
funds.  In addition, demand for repo has also come from states, municipalities, and nonfinancial 
firms. These entities hold cash for various reasons, but would like to have a safe investment, 
which earns interest, while retaining flexibility to use the cash, in short, a demand deposit-like 
product.  Insured checking accounts were imperfect substitutes for repo finance because of 
limitations on deposit insurance, differences in regulatory regimes applied to depository and repo 
finance (e.g., capital requirements), and other factors.  In the last three decades these entities 
                                                        
10 As explained by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010), such opacity makes 
these instruments liquid by preventing adverse selection. 
11 For background on the repo market, see Corrigan and de Terá (2007) and Bank for International Settlements 
(1999). 
12 The collateral received by the depositor in repo may be rehypothecated, that is, the depositor can use it in another, 
unrelated, transaction.  This creates a multiplier process for collateral, like the more familiar money multiplier.  
Since there are no official data on repo, the size of this money multiplier is not known.  Singh and Aitken (2010) try 
to estimate the extent of rehypothecation.  Fegatelli (2010) looks at this issue using data from Clearstream, a 
Luxembourg based clearinghouse.  Also, see Adrian and Shin (2008) who link the use of repo to monetary policy. 
13  Sale and repurchase agreements, like derivatives, have a special status under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
Repurchase agreements are exempted from the automatic stay, so that  a party to a repurchase agreement can 
unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a bankruptcy filing by the other party.   
Without this protection, a party to a repo contract would be a debtor in the bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., 
Johnson (1997) and Schroeder (1999). The safe harbor provision for repo transactions was recently upheld in court 
in a case involving American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. suing Lehman Brothers. See Schweitzer, 
Grosshandler, and Gao (2008).  In Gorton and Metrick (2010), we argue that this bankruptcy safe-harbor was a 
primary driver of the growth of repo. 11 
 
 
have grown in size and become an important feature of the financial landscape. For example, 
according to the BIS (2007); “In 2003, total world assets of commercial banks amounted to USD 
49 trillion, compared to USD 47 trillion of assets under management by institutional investors” 
(p. 1 footnote 1).  
Mutual funds, including in particular MMMFS, are important users of repo.  MMMFs 
held $552 billion in repurchase agreements in December 2008 (Report of the Money Market 
Working Group (2009)). These data are for MMMFs only; there are no data covering all other 
types of mutual funds. The importance of repo for mutual funds motivated eight of the larger 
fund companies to send a letter  (see Letter June 11, 2010) to Barney Frank and Chris Dodd 
expressing concern part of the proposed financial reform legislation “which would result in 
significant unintended consequences for the capital markets. The provision would likely curtail 
the desire of market participants to invest in repurchase agreements (“repos”) . . .” 
Corporate treasurers and state and local governments started to expand their use of repo 
in the 1960s and 1970s, even though repurchase agreements were not standardized until the late 
1980s.  Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) note that corporate treasurers started to use repo in the 
1960s:  “By the mid-1970’s, most corporations, including many that a few years earlier did not 
know what repo was, had amended their bylaws to permit them to invest in repo” (p. 536).  
Corporations use repo to manage their cash. The Association for Financial Professionals (AFP) 
conducts an annual liquidity survey; the 2006 survey reports that 60 percent of their 342 
respondents allow repurchase agreements for their cash management.  Of those, 57 percent are 
allowed to use 50 percent or more of their cash in repo, although in practice the allocation to 
repo is much less (AFP (2006)). 
These nonfinancial firms also have been increasing the amounts of cash that their 
treasury departments hold (in part, perhaps, because of the increasing availability of repo).   
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2008) point out a secular trend that “the average cash-to-assets ratio for 
U.S. industrial firms more than doubles between 1980 and 2006.” This ratio more than doubled 
from 10.5 percent in 1980 to 23.2 percent in 2006. In particular, the average firm can pay back 
all its debt obligations with its cash holdings.  Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2006) also 
study this rise in cash holding by U.S. firms: “At the end of fiscal 2004, cash represented 10.5% 
of the aggregate assets of all Compustat firms. While this is a large percentage, for many firms, 
the dollar value of cash holdings was also large. For example, at the end of 2004 cash holdings of 12 
 
 
Microsoft, General Motors, Ford, General Electric, Exxon Mobil, and Pfizer were respectively 
$60.6 billion, $36.0 billion, $33.4 billion, $23.2 billion, $23.1 billion, and $19.9 billion” (p. 1).  
Also, see Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006).
14   
With regard to state and local governments, the Government Finance Officers 
Association (GFOA) published their first edition of Considerations of Governments in 
Developing a Master Repurchase Agreement in September 1986.  The GFOA (2001) noted that: 
“Repurchase agreements became popular in the state and local government sector in the early 
1970s, when interest rates rose to double-digit levels for the first time in this century.  During 
that era, bank time deposits were restricted to minimum maturities of 30 days, making repos an 
attractive short-term investment alternative for public cash managers holding short-term, 
temporary funds”  (p. 4). 
The above evidence is suggestive, but the unfortunate reality is that there are no official 
data on repo other than what the Federal Reserve collects with regard data to the repo amounts 
done by the 19 primary-dealer banks.  According to Fed data, primary dealers reported financing 
$4.5 trillion in fixed income securities with repo as of March 4, 2008.
 15  But, we know that this 
covers only a fraction of the repo market in the U.S.
16  The U.S. Bond Market Association (now 
known as the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association) conducted a survey of repo 
and securities lending in 2005, estimating that the total exceeded $5.21 trillion. 
One way to estimate the total size of the U.S. repo market is to base it on triparty repo 
data. Triparty repo peaked at $2.8 trillion (see Task Force (2009)). Market participants 
anecdotally provided us with a range of views as to what fraction triparty repo is of the overall 
market.  This leads to an estimate that the U.S. repo market is likely to be roughly the same size 
(or larger) than the total assets in the U.S. banking system of $10 trillion.  Using a different 
method, Singh and Aitken (2010) also find a repo market pre-crisis peak of about $10 trillion. 
Finally, using still a third method, Bank for International Settlements economists Hördahl and 
King (2008) report that repo markets have doubled in size since 2002, “with gross amounts 
outstanding at year-end 2007 of roughly $10 trillion in each of the U.S. and Euro markets, and 
another $1 trillion in the UK repo market” (p. 37).  Finally, the European repo market, widely 
                                                        
14 The upward secular trend in firm cash holdings is pronounced across six of seven industrialized countries over the 
period 1991-2008, studied by Iskandar-Dattta and Jia (2010).  Japan is the outlier, showing a decline. 
15 Flow of Funds data only covers the U.S. primary dealers and so is even lower than the Federal Reserve numbers. 
16 Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data only covers the U.S. primary dealers and so is even lower than the Federal 
Reserve numbers. 13 
 
 
viewed as being much smaller than the U.S. market was EUR 4.87 trillion in June 2009, having 
peaked at EUR 6.78 trillion in June 2007, according to the International Capital Markets 
Association (ICMA) European Repo Market Survey (2010).  According to the figures published 
in the ICMA European Repo Market Survey of June 2009, the repo market globally grew at an 
average rate of 19% per annum between 2001 and 2007. While the available evidence is very 
suggestive that the repo market is very large, it is impossible to say exactly how large.   
Another way to get a sense of the growth in the securitized-banking system is to compare the 
total assets in the traditional regulated banking system to the total assets in the dealer 
(investment) banks, since the latter rely more heavily on repo finance than the former.  For this 
purpose, Federal Flow of Funds data are available, shown in Figure 7. The figure shows that the 
ratio of broker-dealer total assets to commercial banks’ total assets has grown from less than 5 
percent in 1990 to a peak near 25 percent in 2007.  
Some evidence on the use of repo in dealer banks comes from King (2008) and Hördahl and 
King (2008); the latter paper states that “the (former) top U.S. investment banks funded roughly 
half of their assets using repo markets, with additional exposure due to off-balance sheet 
financing of their customers” (p. 39). Some details on dealer use of repo are shown in Table I 
and are consistent this quotation and with Lehman Brothers bankruptcy report (Report of Anton 
R. Valukas (2010)) that: “Lehman funded itself through the short‐term repo markets and had to 
borrow tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in those markets each day from counterparties to 
be able to open for business. Confidence was critical. The moment that repo counterparties were 
to lose confidence in Lehman and decline to roll over its daily funding, Lehman would be unable 
to fund itself and continue to operate.”  (p. 43) 
Notably, commercial banks did not rely heavily on repo.  The amount of securities sold under 
repo as a percentage of total assets from April 1, 2008 to February 29, 2009, was 63 basis points 
(mean) and the median was 2.7 percent (Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2010)). The crisis was 
centered on the dealer banks.  In fact, commercial banks’ balance sheets grew during the crisis 
(He, Khang and Krishnamurthy (2010)). 
For every “repo,” the other side of the transaction is a “reverse repo.” This raises the issue of 
double counting of both repo and reverse repo. The issue concerns whether the relevant number 
is gross repo or net repo for financial firms.  For example, a dealer bank that lent money via repo 
to a hedge fund (which provides the dealer bank with a bond as collateral) and then borrowed 14 
 
 
against that bond from another dealer bank would have a net of zero (ignoring the haircuts). But, 
in a run the depositors want their cash bank and the dealer bank cannot instantaneously get the 
cash back from the hedge fund.  (This would be possible in a clearinghouse arrangement.)  So, it 
would seem that gross repo borrowing is the relevant number. It is not known how much of the 
demand for repo comes from outside the banking system, i.e., are most of the depositor/end-users 
nonbanks? The extent of this issue is unclear as there are no data on the extent of involvement in 
repo from nonfinancial firms and only financial firms have been counted, estimated, or surveyed.   
As discussed above, at least anecdotally, many non-financial firms’ treasury departments (e.g., 
Westinghouse, IBM, Microsoft) invest in repo as do institutional investors.  
 
II.  State Variables: The ABX Indices and the LIB-OIS Spread 
This section introduces the key state variables of the paper.  Section II.A discusses the ABX 
indices, which are proxies for fundamentals of the subprime market.  Section II.B discusses the 
LIB-OIS spread, which is a proxy for fears about bank solvency.  In Section II.C, we plot these 
two state variables against the timeline of the crisis. 
 
A.  Subprime Fundamentals and the ABX Indices 
With respect to the housing market, the fundamentals essentially are housing prices and 
changes in housing prices. Subprime mortgages are very sensitive to housing prices, as shown by 
Gorton (2010). How was information about the fundamentals in the subprime mortgage market 
revealed to market participants? There are no secondary markets for the securities related to 
subprime (mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations). But, in the beginning of 
2006, the growth in the subprime securitization market led to the creation of several subprime-
related indices. Specifically, dealer banks launched the ABX.HE (ABX) index in January 2006. 
The ABX Index is a credit derivative that references 20 equally-weighted subprime RMBS 
tranches. There are also sub-indices linked to a basket of subprime bonds with specific ratings: 
AAA, AA, A, BBB and BBB-. Each sub-index references the 20 subprime RMBS bonds with 
the rating level of the subindex. Every six months the indices are reconstituted based on a pre-
identified set of rules, and a new vintage of the index and sub-indices are issued.
17  
                                                        
17 The index is overseen by Markit Partners.  The dealers provide Markit Partners with daily and monthly marks. 
See http://www.markit.com/information/products/abx.html.  15 
 
 
Gorton (2009) argues that the introduction of the ABX indices is important because it opened 
a (relatively) liquid, publicly observable market that priced subprime risk. The other subprime-
related instruments, RMBSs and CDOs, did not trade in publicly observable markets. In fact, 
securitized products generally have no secondary trading that is publicly visible. Thus, for our 
purposes the ABX indices are important because of the information revelation about the value of 
subprime mortgages, which in turn depends on house prices. Keep in mind that house price 
indices, like the S&P Case-Shiller Indices, are calculated with a two-month lag.
18  Furthermore, 
house price indices are not directly relevant because of the complicated structure of subprime 
securitizations. 
In this paper, we will focus on the BBB ABX tranche of the first vintage of the ABX in 2006, 
which is representative of the riskier levels of subprime securitization. We refer to this tranche of 
the 2006-1 issue simply as “ABX”.  In the next section, we show how the ABX evolved during 
the crisis, and compare this evolution with deterioration in the interbank markets.  
 
B.  The Interbank Market and the LIB-OIS Spread 
Our proxy for the state of the interbank market and, in particular, the repo market, is the 
spread between 3-month LIBOR and the overnight index swap (OIS) rate, which we call the 
LIB-OIS spread.  LIBOR is the rate paid on unsecured interbank loans, cash loans where the 
borrower receives an agreed amount of money either at call or for a given period of time, at an 
agreed interest rate.  These loans are not traded.  Basically, a cash-rich bank “deposits” money 
with a cash-poor bank for a period of time.  The rate on such a deposit is LIBOR, which is the 
interest rate at which banks are willing to lend cash to other financial institutions “in size.” The 
British Bankers’ Association’s (BBA) London interbank offer rate (LIBOR) fixings are 
calculated by taking the average of a survey financial institutions operating in the London 
interbank market.
19 The BBA publishes daily fixings for LIBOR deposits of maturities up to a 
year. 
From the 3-month LIBOR rate we will subtract a measure of interest rate expectations over 
the same term.  This rate is the overnight index swap (OIS) rate.  The overnight index swap is a 
                                                        
18 See 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0.ht
ml . 
19 The BBA eliminates the highest and lowest quartiles of the distribution and average the remaining quotes.  See 
Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008). 16 
 
 
fixed-to-floating interest rate swap that ties the floating leg of the contract to a daily overnight 
reference rate (here, the fed-funds rate).
20 The floating rate of the swap is equal to the geometric 
average of the overnight index over every day of the payment period. When an OIS matures, the 
counterparties exchange the difference between the fixed rate and the average effective fed-funds 
rate over the time period covered by the swap, settling the trade on a net basis. The fixed quote 
on an OIS should represent the expected average of the overnight target rate over the term of the 
agreement. As with swaps generally, there is no exchange of principal and only the net 
difference in interest rates (times the notional amount) is paid at maturity, so OIS contracts have 
little credit risk exposure.
21 
If there is no credit risk and no transactions costs, then the interest rate on an interbank loan 
should equal the overnight index swap (the expected fed funds cost of the loan).  To see this 
consider an example: Bank 1 loans Bank 2 $10 million for three months.  Bank 1 funds the loan 
by borrowing $10 million each day in the overnight fed-funds market.  Further, Bank 1 hedges 
the interest-rate risk by entering into an overnight index swap under which Bank 1 agrees to pay 
a counterparty the difference between the contracted fixed rate and the overnight fed-funds rate 
over the next three months.  In the past arbitrage has kept this difference below 10 bps. 
If the spread between LIBOR and the OIS widens, there is an apparent arbitrage opportunity.  
But, at some times, banks are not taking advantage of it.  Why?  The answer is that there is 
counterparty risk: that is, Bank 1 worries that Bank 2 will default and so there is a premium 
between the expected interest rates over the period, the OIS rate, and the rate on the loan, 
LIBOR. We refer to the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month OIS as “LIB-
OIS.”  
Ideally, we would like to use the LIB-OIS as a pure measure of counterparty risk in the 
banking system.  Schwarz (2009) shows that this interpretation is too narrow, and that the LIB-
OIS reflects both counterparty risk and market-liquidity risk.  In Section IV.E, we use Schwarz’ 
data to divide the LIB-OIS into both counterparty and liquidity risk, and find that the 
counterparty component drives the vast majority of our results, and the liquidity component has 
                                                        
20 There are equivalent swaps in other currencies, which reference other rates. 
21  In addition, credit risk in swaps is managed by requiring that collateral be posted to the party for which the swap 
becomes a liability. 
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no explanatory power.  Thus, in discussing the empirical results below, we refer to LIB-OIS as a 
proxy for counterparty risk, with the evidence for this interpretation given in Section IV.E. 
 
C.  A Timeline for the Crisis 
In Figure 8, we show the ABX and LIB-OIS spreads. For the ABX, we use the 2006-1 BBB 
tranche in all cases. The time period is from January 1, 2007 through December 25, 2008. During 
the full period, the ABX makes a steady rise, whereas the LIB-OIS shows two jumps, in August 
2007 and September 2008. These months are not particularly special for the ABX.  Furthermore, 
the LIB-OIS recovers some ground at the end of 2008, while the ABX spread continues to grow.  
It is difficult to explain why the LIB-OIS spikes occur exactly at these times, and we are not 
attempting an explanation here. Instead, these figures are intended only to illustrate that the 
spikes are not concurrent with major changes in the ABX. 
The first six months of 2007 were ordinary for the vast majority of fixed-income assets. It is 
only when we look at subprime-specific markets that we begin to see the seeds of the crisis.  The 
ABX begins the year at 153 basis points (bps), which is close to its historical average since the 
series began in January 2006, after a first year with almost no volatility.  The first signs of 
trouble appear at the end of January, and by March 1 the spread was 552bps.  The next sustained 
rise came in June, reaching 669bps by the end of that month. In contrast, the LIB-OIS hardly 
moved during the period, steady at around 8bps.  
Of particular interest is the summer of 2007, where the LIB-OIS first signals danger in the 
interbank market.  From its steady starting value of 8 bps, LIB-OIS grows to 13 bps on July 26, 
before exploding past its historical record to 40 bps on August 9, and to new milestones in the 
weeks ahead before peaking at 96 bps on September 10.  This period also marked the initial 
shock for a wide swath of the securitization markets, particularly in high-grade tranches 
commonly used as collateral in the repo market. The ABX is also rising during this period, but 
its most significant move begins earlier, and visually appears to lead the LIB-OIS.  From its 
starting value of 669 bps at the end of June, the spread rises to 1738 bps by the end of July, 
before any significant move in the LIB-OIS.  
The ABX spread continued its steady rise in the first half of 2008, going from 3812 bps to 
6721 bps over the six-month period from January 1 to June 30. Once again, the LIB-OIS is 
behaving differently from the ABX, with trading in a band between 30 and 90 bps. The reduction 18 
 
 
in the LIB-OIS in January is followed by increases through February and March, coincident – or 
perhaps causal – of the trouble at Bear Stearns, which reached its climax with its announced sale 
to JP Morgan on March 16.  
In the second half of 2008, the full force of the panic hit asset markets, financial institutions, 
and the real economy.  The ABX spread continued its steady rise, with prices of pennies on the 
dollar and spreads near 9000 bps by the end of the period.  The LIB-OIS, after a period of 
stability in the summer, began to rise in early September, and then passed the 100 bps threshold 
for the first time on the September 15 bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers. The subsequent 
weeks heralded near collapse of the interbank market, with the LIB-OIS peaking at 364 bps on 
October 10, before falling back to 128 bps by the end of 2008. 
With this background, we turn next to the broad set of assets included in our data sets. 
 
III.  Data 
Our data comes from dealer banks. The dealer banks observe market prices and convert these 
prices into spreads.  The conversion of prices into spreads involves models of default timing and 
recovery amounts, and we are not privy to these models. However, one indication of the quality 
of the data is that it was the source for marking-to-market the books of some major financial 
institutions. The data set comprises 392 series of spreads on structured products, credit derivative 
indices, and a smaller set of single-company credit derivatives.  In each case, the banks capture 
the “on-the-run” bond or tranche, which would be the spreads of interest to market participants. 
Fixed-rate bond spreads are spreads to Treasuries and floating-rate spreads are to LIBOR. 
Appendix B contains a brief discussion of spread calculation. 
Some examples of the asset classes covered include spreads on credit-card securitization 
tranches, auto-loan securitization tranches, and all other major securitization classes. For each 
asset class, e.g., securitized credit-card receivables, there are spreads for each maturity, each 
rating category, and often for both fixed- and floating-rate bonds. For example, for fixed-rate 
credit-card receivables there are spreads for AAA bonds for maturities from two years to ten 
years.  Also included are spreads on CDO and CLO tranches. Some series date back as far as 
January 2001, and others begin as late as 2006. Spreads are based on transactions prices, and if 
there are no such prices, then the series ends.  19 
 
 
Table II provides summary statistics on various categories of asset classes. Panel A shows 
the spreads in basis points. Our state variable, LIB-OIS spreads, are shown first, followed by 
representative asset classes that were exposed to subprime: home-equity loans (HEL), 
mezzanine-collateralized-debt  obligations (Mezzanine CDO),  home-equity lines-of-credit 
(HELOC); also shown are the CDS spreads for Countrywide and Washington Mutual 
(“Wamu”), two of the largest subprime mortgage originators; finally, three of the monoline 
insurers’ CDS spreads are shown.  These firms were alleged to have been heavily exposed to 
subprime risks via credit guarantees made on subprime-related bonds. 
Throughout Table II there are five periods shown: the whole period (January 2007-January 
2009); the first half of 2007, the second half of 2007, all of 2007, and “all of 2008” (which also 
includes January 2009).  In general, the first half of 2007 looks “normal” in the sense that it is 
prior to the panic.  Looking at LIB-OIS, for example, the average is about 8 basis points for the 
first half of 2007, consistent with no arbitrage and no counterparty risk. Also, note that AAA 
HELOC bonds traded at just over 15 basis points in the first half of 2007. The mortgage 
originators and monolines were also trading in normal spread ranges. 
Looking at Panel A, it is clear that the subprime-related structured products and companies 
get hit in the second half of 2007.  HEL, Mezzanine CDOs and HELOCs reach their peaks in the 
second half of 2007. Note that in the cases of HEL BBB and HELOC AAA there are no data in 
2008; these markets simply disappear.
22 This is also true of Countrywide, perhaps the largest 
originator of subprime mortgages.  But, for WAMU and the monoline insurers the peak is in 
2008. 
The standard deviations are also worth noting. For the subprime-related structured asset 
classes, the peak of their spreads occurs in the second half of 2007, but the standard deviations 
are mostly highest in 2008.  Thinking of standard deviations as a rough guide to uncertainty, this 
temporal sequence of rising uncertainty will be important later when we look at the repo market 
in detail. 
Panel B shows asset classes that are non-subprime-related structured products based on U.S. 
portfolios: automobile loans, credit-card receivables, student loans, commercial mortgage-
backed securities, high-grade structured-finance CDOs (HG SF CDO), and mezzanine 
                                                        
22 The dealer banks only use on-the-run prices to calculate spreads.  If there are no on-the-run prices, no spreads are 
calculated. 20 
 
 
structured-finance CDOs (Mezzanine SF CDO). In each case, we show the AAA tranches.  In 
the first half of 2007, the normal state of affairs is that AAA asset-backed securities traded below 
LIBOR, true of auto loans, credit card receivables, and student loans.  For the six categories 
shown, there are increases in the spreads in the second half of 2007, but the large increases are in 
2008.  
Figure 9 is an illustration of the time-series patterns for a few of these non-subprime asset 
classes: automobile loans, credit-card receivables, and student loans.  In each case, the spreads 
appear to move closely with the LIB-OIS.  These co-movements represent an important aspect of 
the crisis: the apparent relationship of the interbank market (LIB-OIS) with spreads on securities 
far removed from subprime housing. In Section IV, we will perform formal tests of these 
relationships. 
The crisis was global. Panel C shows non-U.S. non-subprime-related asset classes, including 
mortgage-backed securities with portfolios of Australian, U.K., and Dutch mortgages.  Also 
shown are U.K. credit-card receivables, European consumer loans, and European automobile 
loans. These categories are all trading normally in the first half of 2007, and show increases in 
their spreads during the second half of 2007. But, the spreads significantly widen in 2008, as do 
the standard deviations of their spreads.  
Panel D summarizes our second data set which is on the interbank repo market.
23 Shown are 
different categories of collateral, in each row. The categories themselves show how far the repo 
market has evolved from simply being a market related to U.S. Treasuries.  For each category the 
annualized repo rate spread to the OIS is shown. These spreads are for overnight repo.
24  Also 
shown is the average haircut on the collateral during the time period. For example, looking at the 
first category, BBB+/A Corporates, the average repo rate spread to OIS in the first half of 2007 
was 2 bps, and the haircut was zero. Repo spreads for AA-AAA corporate bond collateral were 
negative for the first half of 2007. Overall, the patterns in repo are similar to those for the non-
subprime-related asset classes, that is, the spreads rise in the second half of 2007, but become 
dramatically higher in 2008.  The haircuts also become dramatically higher in 2008. The market 
disappeared for unpriced CLO/CDO, unpriced ABS/MBS/all subprime, and for AA-AAA 
CDOs.   
                                                        
23 Repo rates and haircuts could be different for non-dealer bank counterparties, such as hedge funds. This is 
discussed further later in the main text. 
24 Though not analyzed in this paper, the full term structure of repo spreads out to one year, tells a similar story. 21 
 
 
The last row in Panel E gives summary data for the Repo-Rate Index and the Repo-Haircut 
Index – the latter index is plotted in Figure 4 and discussed in the Introduction of this paper.  
During the time that all asset classes have active repo markets in 2007 and early 2008, the Repo-
Rate Index is the equal-weighted average for all the asset classes.
25  As haircuts rise to 100% for 
any given asset class (= no trade) on date t, we drop that class from the index and compute the 
index change for period t using only the classes that traded in both period t-1 and period t.  The 
Repo-Haircut Index is always equal to the average haircut on all nine of the asset classes, with 
100 percent rates included in this average if the asset class disappears.  
 
IV.  Empirical Tests 
 
A.  Methodology and Basic Tests 
We want to test whether the spreads on U.S. non-subprime-related asset classes (AAA 
tranches) move with our state variables for the subprime market (ABX) and for interbank 
counterparty risk (LIB-OIS). For each asset, we want to estimate 
 
Si,t = a0 + a1t + b1ABXt + b2LIB− OISt + b3Xt + ei,t ,    (1) 
 
where t is time a weekly time index, Si,t is the spread on asset i at time t, a0 is a constant, a1 is a 
time trend, ABXt is a vector of the last four observations of the ABX spread including the current 
period, LIB-OISt is a vector of the last four observations of the LIB-OIS spread including the 
current period, and Xt is a vector of control variables.  Since the Si,t spreads are more similar to 
unit-root prices than to i.i.d returns, and since these levels vary significantly over our time 
period, we take first differences of (1) and normalize all changes by their level in the previous 
period: 
 
ΔSi,t = a1 + b1ΔABXt + b2ΔLIB− OISt + b3ΔXt + ei,t     ( 2 )  
 
where the Δ prefix indicates the percentage change of the variable or vector. (Throughout our 
analysis, all references to “changes” will be to “percentage changes”.) While there is a small 
                                                        
25 There are no data available on the amounts of each asset class used as collateral in repo. 22 
 
 
literature on corporate-bond spreads (see Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), and the 
citations therein), there are no studies of spreads on securitized products. We follow Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) in their choice of control variables:
26 
  
•  The 10-year constant maturity treasury rate (10YTreasury),  
•  The square of 10YTreasury, (10YTreasured Squared)  
•  The weekly return of the SP500 Index (SP500_ret).   
•  The  VIX  index (VIX) is a measure of the volatility of the S&P index, 
produced by and traded on the Chicago Board of Trade.  the new version introduce in 
2003, is based on the options prices of the broader S&P 500 index.  Its square 
approximates the conditional risk-neutral expectation of the annualized return 
variance over the next 30 calendar days and thus the corresponding variance swap 
rate.  See Carr and Wu (2006). 
•  The slope of the yield curve, (YCSlope), defined as the difference between the 
10-year and 2-year Treasury bond interest rates.  
•  The overnight swap spread (OIS). 
 
Panel E of Table II gives summary data on these control variables.  Notably, the 10-year 
Treasury rate and the OIS rate both decline significantly in 2008, reflecting the Fed’s actions.  
The return on the S&P is negative in 2008.  And, notably, the VIX index in 2008 is about double 
its level in 2007. In each case, the control variables are first-differenced for estimation of 
Equation (2). 
Some preliminary regression results are given in Table III.  Panel A shows the results for the 
six asset classes of U.S. non-subprime-related assets (AAA tranches) shown in Table II, Panel B.  
At the bottom of the table are F-tests corresponding to the hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
ABX variables are jointly zero and that the coefficients on the LIB-OIS variables are jointly 
zero. For the four securitization categories – credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and 
commercial mortgage-backed securities – the LIB-OIS variables are jointly significant. F-tests 
also show that the ABX coefficients are not jointly significant in any of the regressions. For the 
                                                        
26 Since most of our series are not related to specific companies, we omit the company-specific control variables 
used by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001).  23 
 
 
two categories of CDO, high grade (HG) and mezzanine, neither the LIB-OIS nor the ABX are 
significant. 
Panel B of Table III addresses the global aspects of the crisis. Panel B covers non-U.S. non-
subprime related asset classes, the same ones displayed in Panel C of Table II. All of these asset 
classes are significantly affected by LIB-OIS, but not by the ABX. 
 
B.  Credit Spreads for All Categories and Tranches 
Table III focuses on a subset of the available asset categories, a subset that we think is of 
particular interest, but nevertheless a subset. Table IV summarizes the F-tests for the joint 
significance of the changes in LIB-OIS, for the full set of asset categories, broken down into the 
following categories: subprime-related, U.S.; non-subprime-related; non-U.S. non-subprime-
related; financial firms (CDS spreads); and industrial firms (CDS spreads). The table has three 
panels, corresponding to the whole period from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009, and sub-
periods.  We also performed similar F-tests for the ABX and lags on all asset categories.  These 
results are not tabulated, because there is nothing of interest to show: overall, changes in the 
ABX are no better than noise at predicting changes in spreads. 
Some highlights from Table IV are as follows. Subprime-related asset categories and the 
broad-array of financial firms are not typically correlated to the LIB-OIS.  But, for the overall 
period, Panel A, 66 percent of the U.S. non-subprime asset classes are significantly positively 
correlated at the 10 percent confidence level. Similarly, 76 percent of the non-U.S. non-subprime 
categories are positively correlated at the 10 percent level or lower.  Note that most of this occurs 
in 2007 for the non-U.S. structured products, but for the U.S. non-subprime structured products it 
is split across 2007 and 2008. Also, note that for 2008, Panel C shows that 75 percent of the 
industrials are significantly, positively correlated to changes in LIB-OIS, indicating the real 
affects hitting the economy. In 2007, Panel B, there are no such real effects. 
Table V presents the F-test results divided by rating category.  Assets in all rating categories 
were eligible for repo, but AAA collateral was likely to be the most widely used.  The table is 
suggestive in this regard, but not definitive.  Looking at the whole period, Panel A, 62% of the 
AAA products were positively and significantly correlated with changes in LIB-OIS.  This is 
about equally divided between the two sub-periods. For AA, A and BBB rated bonds, the 24 
 
 
percentages that are significantly positive for the whole period are 28, 55 and 53 percent, 
respectively.  For A and BBB this is about equally divided between the two subperiods. 
 
C.  Repo Spreads 
In a world with known and certain values for collateral and no transactions costs for selling 
collateral, repo rates should be equal to the risk-free rate, and spreads would be zero: a 
lender/depositor would have no fear of default, since the collateral could be freely seized and 
sold.  In reality, collateral pricing can be uncertain, and illiquidity and volatility in the secondary 
markets for this collateral can induce large transactions costs following a default.  In this case, 
measures of bank-counterparty risk (LIB-OIS) may be relevant to lenders, and in the case of 
default they would be sensitive to uncertainty about collateral values. Lenders could then 
demand higher rates and/or higher haircuts. Higher rates would occur because the loans are no 
longer risk free; higher haircuts could occur to adjust for the uncertain value of the collateral, 
since each dollar of collateral may worth much less by the time it can be sold.  
To test for the quantitative importance of these relationships, we first estimate a version of 
Equation (2) for repo spreads: 
 
ΔRj,t = a1 +b1ΔABXt +b2ΔLIB−OISt +b3ΔXt +b4ΔVOL j,t + ei,t   (3) 
 
where Rj,t is the average spread of repo rates to the OIS for some class j of collateral (as in Table 
II, Panel D), VOLj,t is a vector of the last four “expected volatilities” (defined below) for that 
class of collateral, and all other variables are defined as in Equation (2).   
VOLj,t is a forward-looking measure, defined here as the average absolute (weekly) change in 
spreads over the next four weeks
27:  
 
VOLj,t =
| ΔSj,t+s |
4
⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟
s=1
4
∑ ,         ( 4 )  
 
where Sj,t is the average spread to OIS for all assets in class j: 
 
                                                        
27 All results are qualitatively similar if we use the eight weeks or twelve weeks instead of four weeks. 25 
 
 
Sj,t = Si,t,i ∈ j.           ( 5 )  
 
ΔVOLj,t is defined as the difference between expected volatility today and realized volatility 
over the previous four weeks (not including the current week): 
 
  ΔVOLj,t =VOLj,t −VOLj,t−5  .        (6)   
  Note that volatility uses absolute differences, and not percentage differences, because 
percentage differences are harder to interpret across multiple weeks.  Also, since we use future 
information for our expected-volatility proxy, the resulting estimates could not be part of an 
implementable investment strategy. This restriction does not matter for our analysis, since we are 
not seeking to build investment portfolios from these results. In any case, we don’t really have a 
choice here, since there is no way to extract volatility expectations from historical spread data 
alone. 
We estimate (3) for all five classes of collateral that have data available to construct the VOL 
measure.
28  The regression results for these five classes are shown in Table VI. The final rows 
show the results of the F-tests for the joint significance of LIB-OIS (Test 1), the ABX (Test 2) 
and VOL changes (Test 3), respectively. These tests show that the changes in repo spreads are 
significantly related to the change in LIB-OIS for all five categories, with almost all of the effect 
coming in the contemporaneous period. Changes in repo spreads are not significantly related to 
changes in the ABX or VOL or to any of the other control variables.  Thus, just as we found for 
credit spreads in our earlier analysis, the state variable for bank-counterparty risk is the only 
significant correlate with repo spreads. 
 
D.  Repo Haircuts 
It seems natural that banks would have to raise repo spreads to attract funds. But, higher rates 
do not by themselves cause a systemic event.  For a “run on repo”, we need to see that the 
depositors withdraw from the bank, that is, market participants demand higher repo haircuts. 
Figure 4 showed that this did occur.  In this subsection we turn to examining repo haircuts. 
                                                        
28 For the other four classes of collateral shown in Panel D of Table I, we do not have data for the spreads of the 
underlying assets. 26 
 
 
First, as regards the data, the size of repo haircuts depends on the identities of the 
counterparties and on the type of collateral.  See Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010b) for a 
discussion of this point.  Our data set is from a high-quality dealer bank transacting with other 
high-quality dealer banks. Other repo data that we have involves different types of 
counterparties, e.g., a dealer bank providing collateralized funds to a hedge fund, via reverse 
repo.  The haircuts that a hedge fund faces when borrowing from a dealer bank are larger than 
what the dealer faces in the interbank market, for the same bond (on the same date).  All the 
haircut data sets show the same pattern as displayed in Figure 4, but they do not all start at zero 
haircuts prior to the crisis.  The data set we analyze here is the most extensive. 
Haircuts are a puzzle.  If “depositors” in the repo market, receiving collateral to protect their 
deposits, were concerned that the bank might fail, causing them to need to sell the collateral, then 
the risks of what price they would realize would enter their calculation.  If the market for the 
collateral is volatile, then standard finance theory suggests that they should ask for a higher repo 
rate initially.  Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010a,b) argue that debt, and repo in particular, are 
optimally designed securities which are used to intertemporally transport value.  Their design is 
such as to minimize the variance of their value in the face of public shocks. A “haircut” is 
sometimes needed to protect against such volatility and provide an incentive for a counterparty to 
repurchase the security. Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010b) predict that haircuts are 
increasing in expected future volatility.  We next explore the factors related to these increases 
using the same regression framework as we did for repo spreads: 
 
ΔH j,t = a1 +b1ΔABXt +b2ΔLIB−OISt +b3ΔXt +b4ΔVOL j,t + ei,t  ,  (7) 
 
where Hj,t is the average haircut for all assets in class j, and all other variables are defined as in 
(3).
29  Since haircuts are already defined as a percentage of the total value of the underlying 
collateral, the change in haircuts on the left-hand-side of equation (7) is already given in 
percentages. Table VII summarizes the results. As we have found in earlier tests, the ABX and 
the control variables are not significant. In contrast to previous regressions, the change in the 
                                                        
29 It may seem natural that repo spreads and repo haircuts should be jointly determined.  Unfortunately, as discussed 
below, the theory is not sufficiently developed to provide much guidance here, especially with regard to 
identification.  27 
 
 
LIB-OIS is also not significant.  The only variable with any explanatory power is the proxy for 
expected volatility, which is significant for three of the five classes of collateral.  
  The key finding here is that both repo spreads and repo haircuts rose during the crisis, 
with these increases correlated either to concerns about counterparty risk (for spreads), or to 
uncertainty about collateral values (for haircuts). While these results are somewhat different for 
spreads and haircuts, we suspect that this system is jointly determined, and that a disruption in 
the interbank market and increases in uncertainty about collateral are both necessary conditions 
for a run on repo. In an environment with no counterparty risk, there is no reason to expect 
haircuts to be affected by uncertainty about collateral; similarly, high counterparty risk by itself 
would be unlikely to affect repo spreads if all collateral had fixed values and liquid markets.  It 
seems unlikely that nature will give us an example with rising VOL but no change in LIB-OIS. 
Instead, all of these things happened at the same time, and it is not possible to disentangle the 
exact causes. 
 
E.  LIB-OIS: Counterparty Risk or Market-Liquidity Risk? 
Our results show a strong correlation between the LIB-OIS and both credit spreads and 
repo rates, and we have interpreted the LIB-OIS as a proxy for counterparty risk.  However, 
Schwarz (2009) demonstrates that, during the early stages of the crisis, the LIB-OIS was driven 
at least as much by market-liquidity risk as by counterparty risk.  We can use Schwarz’ data and 
methods to decompose the LIB-OIS relationships for part of our sample period. For these tests, 
we use Schwarz’ “credit-tiering” measure, which represents the average spread in overnight 
borrowing rates between “high-risk” and “low-risk” banks.
30  As shown in Schwarz (2009), this 
measure can be thought of as a proxy for counterparty risk, and it explains some (but not most) 
of the variation in LIB-OIS from January 1, 2007 through April 30, 2008, the last date that her 
series is available.  
In our first set of tests, we replace the ΔLIB-OIS variables in (2), (3) and (4) with 
analogous changes in the credit-tiering measure.  The results – for the time period through April 
30, 2008 – are almost as strong as for the LIB-OIS variable over the same time period.  For 176 
non-subprime related U.S. bond spreads, the credit-predicted component is significant 60 times 
                                                        
30 We thank Krista Schwartz for sharing her credit-tiering measure with us.  See Schwartz (2009) for details on the 
construction of this measure and its relationship to market liquidity and LIB-OIS.  28 
 
 
at the one-percent level and an additional 28 times at the five-percent level. These results suggest 
that Schwartz (2009) credit-tiering measure may be the ideal proxy for counterparty risk – even 
better than LIB-OIS, which is contaminated by other factors – if it were available for the entire 
sample period. For the haircut regressions in (4), the credit-tiering measure – like LIB-OIS – is 
insignificant in all cases.
31 
  In our second set of tests, we employ a two-step procedure.  We first regress LIB-OIS on 
the credit-tiering measure, and use the point estimate of the coefficient from this regression to 
decompose LIB-OIS into a “credit-predicted variable” and a residual, and into weekly changes 
for both of those components.  The residual here would include market-liquidity and any other 
unexplained portions of LIB-OIS. We then replace ΔLIB-OIS with these two components – 
predicted and residual – in (2), (3), and (4).  We find that the credit-predicted component 
performs much better than the residual for predicting credit spreads and repo rates. For example, 
for the 176 non-subprime related U.S. bond spreads, the credit-predicted component is 
significant 35 times at the one-percent level and an additional 31 times at the five-percent level.  
In contrast, the residual is never significant for these bonds at the one-percent level, and only 
four times at the five-percent level – less than would be expected by chance.  Thus, for the early 
part of the crisis, it seems that the counterparty-risk component of LIB-OIS is much more 
important for our results than is the market-liquidity component. 
  Overall, these results support the interpretation of LIB-OIS as a proxy for counterparty 
risk in our results.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
How did problems in the subprime mortgages cause a systemic event?  Our answer is that 
there was a run in the repo market. The location and size of subprime risks held by counterparties 
in the repo market were not known and led to fear that liquidity would dry up for collateral, in 
particular non-subprime related collateral. Public shocks causing expected future spread 
volatility led to increases in the repo haircuts, which is tantamount to massive withdrawals from 
the banking system.  
The banking system has changed, with “securitized banking” playing an increasing role 
alongside traditional banking. One large area of securitized banking – the securitization of 
                                                        
31 Detailed tables of all the results for this section are available from the authors. 29 
 
 
subprime home mortgages – began to weaken in early 2007, and continued to decline throughout 
2007 and 2008.  But, the weakening of subprime per se was not the shock that caused systemic 
problems. The first systemic event occurs in August 2007, with a shock to the repo market that 
we demonstrate using the “LIB-OIS,” the spread between the LIBOR and the OIS, as a proxy.  
The reason that this shock occurred in August 2007 – as opposed to any other month of 2007 – is 
perhaps unknowable. We hypothesize that the market slowly became aware of the risks 
associated with the subprime market, which then led to doubts about repo collateral and bank 
solvency.  At some point – August 2007 in this telling – a critical mass of such fears led to the 
first run on repo, with lenders no longer willing to provide short-term finance at historical 
spreads and haircuts. 
After August 2007, the securitized-banking model was under pressure, with small equity 
bases stretched by increasing haircuts on high-grade collateral. We see evidence of this pressure 
in the co-movement of spreads on a wide variety of AAA and AA credits. This pressure 
contributed to the forced rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the failure of Lehman 
Brothers In September 2008. The second systemic event and run on repo occurred with the 
failure of Lehman. In this second event, we see parallels to 19
th century banking crises, with a 
famine of liquidity leading to significant premia on even the safest of assets.  30 
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Appendix A: Glossary of Key Terms and Asset Classes 
 
This glossary provides definitions for all terms given in bold in the body of the paper and all 
asset classes listed in Table 1. For the latter group, we include the panel location of that variable 
in parenthesis following the definition (e.g: Table I – Panel A).  
 
AA-AAA ABS RMBS/CMBS: Residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) or 
commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) with ratings between AA and AAA, inclusive.  
(Table I - Panel D) 
<AA ABS RMBS-CMBS: Residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) or commercial 
mortgage-backed security (CMBS) with ratings between AA and AAA, inclusive. (Table I - 
Panel D) 
AA-AAA CDO:  Collateralized debt obligations (CDO) with ratings between AA and 
AAA, inclusive. (Table I - Panel D) 
AA-AAA CLO:  Collateralized loan obligations (CDO) with ratings between AA and 
AAA, inclusive. (Table I - Panel D) 
A-AAA ABS Auto/CC/SL:  Asset-backed securities (ABS) comprised of auto loans, 
credit-card receivables, or student loans, with ratings between A and AAA, inclusive. (Table I - 
Panel D) 
ABX, ABX Index, ABX Index Spread: The ABX Index is a credit derivative that references 
20 equally-weighted subprime RMBS tranches. There are also sub-indices linked to a basket of 
subprime bonds with specific ratings: AAA, AA, A BBB and BBB-. Each sub-index references 
the 20 subprime RMBS bonds with the rating level of the subindex. Every six months the indices 
are reconstituted based on a pre-identified set of rules, and a new vintage of the index and sub-
indices are issued. In this paper, we focus on the BBB ABX tranche of the first vintage of the 
ABX in 2006, which is representative of the riskier levels of subprime securitization. We refer to 
this tranche of the 2006-1 issue simply as “ABX”.   
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS):  An asset-backed security is a bond which is backed by the 
cash flows from a pool of specified assets in a special purpose vehicle rather than the general 
credit of a corporation.  The asset pools may be residential mortgages, in which case it is a 
residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS), commercial mortgages – a commercial 37 
 
 
mortgage-backed security (CMBS), automobile loans, credit card receivables, student loans, 
aircraft leases, royalty payments, and many other asset classes. 
Australia RMBS AAA: AAA-rated RMBS backed by Australian mortgages. (Table I – 
Panel C) 
Auto AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by auto loans. (Table 1 – Panel B) 
BBB+/A Corporates: Corporate bonds rated between BBB+ and A, inclusive. (Table I - 
Panel D) 
Cards AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by credit-card receivables. (Table I – Panel B) 
CMBS AAA:  AAA-rated Commercial-mortgage-backed securities. (Table I – Panel B)  
Credit Default Swaps (CDS):  A credit default swap is derivative contract in which one 
party agrees to pay the other a fixed periodic coupon for the specified life of the agreement. The 
other party makes no payments unless a specified credit event occurs. Credit events are typically 
defined to include a material default, bankruptcy or debt restructuring for a specified reference 
asset. If such a credit event occurs, the party makes a payment to the first party, and the swap 
then terminates. The size of the payment is usually linked to the decline in the reference asset's 
market value following the credit event. 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs): A CDO is a special purpose vehicle, which buys a 
portfolio of fixed income assets, and finances the purchase of the portfolio via issuing different 
tranches of risk in the capital markets. These tranches are senior tranches, rated Aaa/AAA, 
mezzanine tranches, rated Aa/AA to Ba/BB, and equity tranches (unrated).  Of particular interest 
are ABS CDOs, which have underlying portfolios consisting of asset-backed securities (ABS), 
including residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS). 
Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs): A CLO is a securitization of commercial bank 
loans. 
Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities (CMBS): See asset-backed securities, above. 
Dutch RMBS AAA: AAA-rated RMBS backed by Dutch mortgages. (Table I – Panel C) 
European Auto AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by European auto loans (Table I – Panel C) 
European Consumer Receivables AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by European consumer 
receivables (Table I – Panel C) 38 
 
 
Haircut: The collateral pledged by borrowers towards the repo has a haircut or “initial 
margin” applied, which means the collateral is valued at less than market value. This haircut 
reflects the perceived underlying risk of the collateral and protects the lender against a change in 
its value. Haircuts are different for different asset classes and ratings. 
HEL BBB: BBB-rated ABS backed by Home-equity loans with BBB ratings (Table 1- 
Panel A) 
HELOC AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by Home-equity lines-of-credit (Table I- Panel A) 
HG SF CDO (High-grade structured-finance CDOs): High-grade structured-finance 
CDOs buy collateral consisting of the AAA and AA-rated tranches of securitized bonds. (Table 1 
– Panel B) 
Home-equity loans (HEL): A home equity loan is a line of credit under which a home 
owner can borrower using the home equity as collateral.  
Home-equity lines-of-credit (HELOC): A HELOC differs from a home equity loan in that 
the borrower does not borrower the full amount of the loan at the outset, but can draw down the 
line of credit over a specified period of time with a maximum amount. 
LIB-OIS:  The spread between the LIBOR and the OIS. 
LIBOR: The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a series of interest rates, of 
different maturities and currencies, at which banks offer to lend fund to each other.  These rates 
are calculated by the British Bankers’ Association as the averages of quotes contributed by a 
panel of banks and announced at 11:00 Am local time in England.  This is called the rate 
“fixing.” Quotes are ranked and the top and bottom quartiles are discarded.  LIBOR is fixed for 
15 different maturities, from overnight to one year, and in ten international currencies.  Similar 
fixing arrangements exist in many markets around the world.  See Gyntelberg and Wooldridge 
(2008). 
Mezzanine SF CDO:  A Mezzanine structure-finance CDO refers to a collateralized debt 
obligation where the underlying portfolio consists of tranches of different asset-backed 
securities that are rated between BBB and A, inclusive. (Table I – Panel B) 
Monoline Insurers, Monoline Insurance Companies (“monolines”): Insurance companies 
that are restricted by regulation to one line of the business, the business of issuing financial 
guarantees on bonds, that is insurance against the loss due to default of specified bonds.  The 
first such company was AMBAC Financial Group Inc., formed in 1971, followed by MBIA 39 
 
 
formed in 1983.  In 1989 a law in New York limited the sale of financial insurance products by 
those companies solely to bond insurance, making them “monolines.”  
Mortgage Originators: Financial firms that underwrite and fund residential and possibly 
commercial, mortgages. 
OIS: See Overnight Index Swap (Table I – Panel E). 
Overnight Index Swap (OIS): An Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) is a fixed/floating interest 
rate swap where the floating leg of the swap is tied to a published index of a daily overnight rate 
reference. The term ranges from one week to two years (sometimes more). At maturity, the two 
parties agree to exchange the difference between the interest accrued at the agreed fixed rate and 
interest accrued through geometric averaging of the floating index rate on the agreed notional 
amount. This means that the floating rate calculation replicates the accrual on an amount 
(principal plus interest) rolled at the index rate every business day over the term of the swap. If 
cash can be borrowed by the swap receiver on the same maturity as the swap and at the same rate 
and lent back every day in the market at the index rate, the cash payoff at maturity will exactly 
match the swap payout: the OIS acts as a perfect hedge for a cash instrument. Since indices are 
generally constructed on the basis of the average of actual transactions, the index is generally 
achievable by borrowers and lenders. Economically, receiving the fixed rate in an OIS is like 
lending cash. Paying the fixed rate in an OIS is like borrowing cash. Settlement occurs net on the 
earliest practical date. There is no exchange of principal. The index rate used is typically the 
weighted average rate for overnight transactions as published by the central bank (e.g., the 
effective fed funds rate). 
Repo-Haircut Index: The equal-weighted average haircut for all nine of the asset classes in 
Panel D of Table I.  Haircuts of 100% (= no trade) are included in this average. (Table I, Panel 
D) 
Repo-Rate Index: During the time that all asset classes have active repo markets in 2007 
and early 2008, this index is identical to the equal-weighted average repo rate for all nine the 
asset classes in Panel D of Table I.  As haircuts rise to 100% for any given asset class (= no 
trade) on date t, we drop that class from the index and compute the index change for period t 
using only the classes that traded in both period t-1 and period t.  (Table I, Panel D) 
Repurchase Agreements (repo), Reverse Repurchase Agreements (reverse repo):  A sale 
and repurchase agreement, known as a “repo” for short, is a sale of a security combined with an 40 
 
 
agreement to repurchase the same security at a specified price at the end of the contract.   
Economically, a repo is a secured or collateralized loan, that is, a loan of cash against a security 
as collateral.  From the point of view of the borrower of the cash (who is putting up the security 
as collateral), it is a reverse repurchase agreement, or “reverse repo.”   
Residential Mortgage-backed Security (RMBS):  See asset-backed securities, above. 
Securitization: The process of financing by segregating specified cash flows, from loans 
originated by a firm (the “sponsor”) and selling claims specifically linked to these specified cash 
flows. This is accomplished by setting up another company, called a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) or special purpose entity, and then selling the specified cash flows to this company, which 
purchases the rights to the cash flows by issuing (rated) securities into the capital market.  The 
sponsor services the cash flows, that is, makes sure that the cash flows are arriving, etc. The SPV 
is not an operating company in the usual sense.  It is more of a robot company in that it is a set of 
rules.  It has no employees or physical location. 
Securitized Banking:  Refers in this paper to the nexus of securitization and repurchase 
markets where “depositors” are able to engage in (reverse) repo by depositing money in 
exchange for securitized bonds as collateral. 
Securitized Bonds: A general term referring to any traded and rated tranche of an ABS, 
RMBS, CMBS, CDO, or CLO. 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV): An SPV or special purpose entity (SPE) is a legal entity 
which has been set up for a specific, limited, purpose by another entity, the sponsoring firm. An 
SPV can take the form of a corporation, trust, partnership, or a limited liability company. The 
SPV may be a subsidiary of the sponsoring firm, or it may be an “orphan” SPV, one that is not 
consolidated with the sponsoring firm for tax, accounting, or legal purposes (or may be 
consolidated for some purposes but not others).  An SPV can only carry out some specific 
purpose, or circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions.  An essential feature of an 
SPV is that it be “bankruptcy remote,” that is, that the SPV never be able to become legally 
bankrupt.  The most straightforward way to achieve this would be for the SPV to waive its right 
to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, but this is legally unenforceable. The only way to 
completely eliminate the risk of either voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy is to create the SPV 
in a legal form that is ineligible to be a debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.   41 
 
 
Structured Finance: A broad term used to describe securitized bonds, but also more 
generally any bond with an embedded derivative. 
Student AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by student loans. (Table I – Panel B) 
Tranche: A tranche (French for “cut”) refers to a slice of an portfolio ordered by seniority, 
e.g., a senior tranche or AAA tranche is more senior than a junior tranche or BBB-rated tranche. 
Triparty Repo: A sale and repurchase agreement that is intermediated by a custodian bank 
of international clearing organization. The intermediary manages the transaction including 
marking-to-market of the collateral. Parties to the transaction agree to an eligible collateral 
profile which determines what bonds can be used as collateral. The intermediary bears intra-day 
risk; see Task Force on Tri-Party Infrastructure (2010). 
UK Cards AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by UK credit-card receivables (Table I – Panel C) 
UK RMBS AAA: AAA-rated RMBS backed by UK mortgages. (Table I – Panel C) 
Unpriced ABS/MBS, All Subprime:  All tranches of ABS, MBS and all subprime 
securitized bonds which do not have public pricing posted on Bloomberg or Reuters (two news 
services used by traders)  (Table I - Panel D) 
Unpriced CDO/CLO: All tranches of CDO and CLO securitized bonds which do not have 
public pricing posted on Bloomberg or Reuters (two news services used by traders)  (Table I - 
Panel D) 
VIX:  The VIX index is a measure of the volatility of the S&P index, produced by and traded 
on the Chicago Board of Trade.  The new version of the index introduced in 2003, is based on 
the options prices of the broader S&P 500 index.  Its square approximates the conditional risk-
neutral expectation of the annualized return variance over the next 30 calendar days and thus the 
corresponding variance swap rate.  See Carr and Wu (2006).  (Table I – Panel E) 
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Appendix B: The Spread Data 
Spreads are not a common variable of analysis for financial economists, who prefer to focus 
on returns. As a practical matter, however, interest rate risk is frequently hedged, leaving credit 
risk as the focus.  Credit spreads isolate the risk of default and the recovery rate. Thus, when 
assessing fixed income securities, investors focus on spreads as a common measure for 
determining how much they are being paid to bear the credit risk embedded in a security. 
For fixed rate instruments, the spread is the yield spread, i.e., the difference between the 
yield-to-maturity of the credit risky instrument and the benchmark instrument (LIBOR) with the 
same maturity. Floating rate instrument prices are converted to a spreads by determining the 
discount margin, which is the fixed amount to be added to the current LIBOR rate that is 
required to reprice the bond to par.  The discount margin measures the yield relative to the 
current LIBOR rate and so does not take into account the term structure of interest rates. 
The discount margin, dm, satisfies the following relationship: 
  
where:   
 
P = Price of the floating rate note (FRN) per $100 face value; 
 
qm = Quoted margin on FRN; 
 
dm = discount margin; 
 
yi = Assumed value of the reference rate (LIBOR) in period i; 
 
n = number of period until maturity; 
 
m= number of period per year. 
 
The formula shows that if the quoted margin is equal to the discount margin, then the second 
term is zero and the FRN is valued at par.  If the current price of the floater differs from par, then 
the discount margin is nonzero.  The discount margin assumes that the cash flows over the 43 
 
 
remaining life of the bond are determined by the current reference rate value.  The margin is 
selected so that the present value of the cash flows is equal to the security’s price.  The discount 
margin is a measure which is similar to yield-to-maturity for fixed rate instruments.  It expresses 
the price of an FRN relative to the current LIBOR level.  See Fabozzi and Mann (2000). 
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Figure 4: The Repo-Haircut Index  
 
 
 
Notes: The repo-haircut index is the equally-weighted average haircut for all nine asset 
classes included in Table I, Panel D. 48 
 
 
Figure 5: Issuance in U.S. Capital Markets ($ billions) 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Agencies, Thomson Financial, Inside MBS & 
ABS, Bloomberg. 
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FIGURE 7 
 
Source: Federal Flow of Funds. 51 
 
 
  
FIGURE 8: ABX vs. LIB-OIS 
 
Notes:  ABX is the 2006-1 BBB tranche.  LIB-OIS spreads on left-hand Y-axis, ABX 
spreads on right-hand y-axis.  Both scales are in basis points. 
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Figure 9: LIB-OIS and Non-Subprime-Related Asset Classes 
 
 
  
Notes:  LIB-OIS is shown with the spreads on AAA-rated asset-backed securities: student 
loans, credit cards, and auto loans. The scale is in basis points. 
 
 
 Table I: Broker-Dealer Repo Financing ($ billions) 
 
 Mid-2008  GS  MS  LEH  ML  BSC  Sum 
Financial instruments owned  411,194 390.393 269,409  288,925 141,104  1,501,025
     of which pledged (and can be repledged)  37,383  140,000 43,031  27,512  22,903  270,829 
     of which pledged (and cannot be 
repledged)  120,980 54,492 80,000 53,025  54,000  362,497 
     of which not pledged at all  252,831 195,901 146,378  208,388 64,201  867,699 
% own financial instruments pledged  38.5% 49.8% 45.7% 27.9%  54.5%  42.2% 
Source: Company 10-Qs.  See King (2008) and Aitken and Singh (2009). 
 
 End of 2006  GS  MS  LEH  ML  BSC  Sum  ML*  ML** 
Financial instruments owned  334,561 380,853 226,596  312,187 125,168  1,379,365 287,258 203,848 
     of which pledged (and can be repledged)  35,998  125,000 42,600  58,966  15,967  278,531  58,966  58,966 
     of which pledged (and cannot be 
repledged)  134,310 63,903 75,000 68,594  41,000  382,807 68,594 68,594 
     of which not pledged at all  164,253 191,950 108,996  184,627 68,201  718,027  159,698 76,288 
% own financial instruments pledged  50.9% 49.6% 51.9% 40.9%  45.5%  47.9%  44.4% 62.6% 
Source: Company 10-Qs.   
 
Merrill Lynch (ML) did not list “Financial instruments owned.“ Instead, ML listed “Trading assets,“ “Investment securities“ and 
“Securities received as collateral“. In the column ML, all three asset categories were used. In the column marked ML**, only Trading 
assets and Investment securities were included. In the case of ML**, only Trading assets were used. 
 
 
 Table II 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the state variable, credit spreads, repo spreads and control variables 
used in this paper. For each series we show summary statistics for the whole period and four subperiods. Panel A 
shows statistics for the state variable LIB-OIS and the credit spreads of three categories of subprime related assets. 
Panel B and Panel C shows statistics for the credit spreads of U.S. and non-U.S. non-subprime asset classes. Panel D 
reports the statistics for the spreads between three-month repo rates and OIS. Panel E shows statistics for the five 
control variables used in the regression analysis. All variables given in this Table are defined in Appendix A.   All 
spreads are measured in basis points, with spread computations explained in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: State Variable and Subprime Related Assets Class 
Series Periods  Mean  Median  Std.  Err.  Max  Min 
State Variable 
LIB-OIS Spread 
Whole period  72.43  66.44  67.57  354.20  7.45 
First half of 2007  7.97  7.88  0.42  9.15  7.45 
Second half of 2007  58.71  60.78  28.64  104.73  7.70 
All of 2007  33.34  8.50  32.53  104.73  7.45 
All of 2008  108.10  77.20  71.61  354.20  24.33 
Credit Spreads  of Sub-prime Related Assets 
HEL BBB 
Whole period  714.25  425.00  545.26  1800.00  170.00 
First half of 2007  273.27  250.00  93.54  425.00  170.00 
Second half of 2007  1113.46  1000.00  441.03  1800.00  350.00 
All of 2007  693.37  425.00  528.75  1800.00  170.00 
Mezzanine CDO BBB 
Whole period  2861.93  2969.42  2023.57  8421.76  365.00 
First half of 2007  627.50  650.00  152.50  950.00  365.00 
Second half of 2007  2178.47  1940.75  659.41  3063.16  1100.00 
All of 2007  1402.99  1025.00  915.27  3063.16  365.00 
All of 2008  4858.38  4687.97  1268.88  8421.76  3016.83 
HELOC AAA 
Whole Period  121.60  18.00  157.64  500.00  14.00 
First half of 2007  15.35  15.00  1.23  18.00  14.00 
Second half of 2007  213.31  195.00  159.59  500.00  15.00 
All of 2007  114.33  18.00  149.92  500.00  14.00 
CDS Spreads of Subprime Mortgage Lenders 
Countrywide 
Whole period  275.86  220.02  253.96  1185.84  22.52 
First half of 2007  51.10  50.79  17.64  77.57  22.52 
Second half of 2007  445.43  282.34  338.99  1088.00  62.53 
All of 2007  248.26  71.09  310.03  1088.00  22.52 
All of 2008  301.04  260.00  188.39  1185.84  95.67 
WAMU 
Whole period  413.57  318.33  643.09  4352.43  19.61 
First half of 2007  35.39  33.68  11.11  57.38  19.61 
Second half of 2007  189.27  122.03  133.36  438.47  42.55 
All of 2007  112.33  50.32  121.71  438.47  19.61 
All of 2008  815.23  438.90  818.44  4352.43  255.00 
CDS Spreads of Monoline Insurers 
MBIA 
Whole period  911.33  391.88  1116.88  4153.55  13.46 
First half of 2007  24.20  22.66  9.34  42.20  13.46 
Second half of 2007  164.92  121.69  89.44  322.96  45.18 
All of 2007  94.56  43.69  94.93  322.96  13.46 
All of 2008  1656.46  1391.26  1101.33  4153.55  372.55 
MGIC 
Whole period  520.96  453.46  406.35  1411.73  27.48 
First half of 2007  51.42  52.40  17.82  81.32  27.48 
Second half of 2007  270.97  245.95  138.90  528.53  71.21 
All of 2007  161.20  79.09  147.99  528.53  27.48 
All of 2008  849.17  885.61  262.06  1411.73  320.00 
Radian 
Whole period  1072.85  809.83  956.80  3164.27  28.53 
First half of 2007  56.54  55.49  18.12  93.39  28.53 
Second half of 2007  536.20  559.22  261.37  1000.32  73.26 
All of 2007  296.37  86.62  303.80  1000.32  28.53 
All of 2008  1781.22  1938.22  781.58  3164.27  704.70 
            49 
 
 
Panel B:U.S. Non-Subprime Asset Classes 
Series Periods  Mean  Median  Std.  Err.  Max  Min 
Auto AAA 
Whole period  109.42  55.00  153.65  500.00  -1.00 
First half of 2007  -1.00  -1.00  0.00  -1.00  -1.00 
Second half of 2007  23.38  20.00  16.11  50.00  -1.00 
All of 2007  11.19  -1.00  16.70  50.00  -1.00 
All of 2008  199.04  110.00  167.75  500.00  50.00 
Cards AAA 
Whole period  101.92  55.00  148.93  550.00  -4.00 
First half of 2007  -3.31  -3.00  0.47  -3.00  -4.00 
Second half of 2007  24.88  23.00  17.73  55.00  -3.00 
All of 2007  10.79  -3.00  18.89  55.00  -4.00 
All of 2008  185.05  100.00  166.45  550.00  50.00 
Student AAA 
Whole period  65.11  30.00  90.47  325.00  -3.00 
First half of 2007  -1.12  -1.00  1.18  0.00  -3.00 
Second half of 2007  17.92  18.00  10.28  35.00  0.00 
All of 2007  8.40  0.00  12.03  35.00  -3.00 
All of 2008  116.84  65.00  99.71  325.00  25.00 
CMBS AAA 
Whole period  241.16  123.00  313.92  1350.00  22.00 
First half of 2007  26.27  26.50  2.79  31.00  22.00 
Second half of 2007  65.88  62.00  21.83  105.00  31.50 
All of 2007  46.08  31.25  25.25  105.00  22.00 
All of 2008  419.12  250.00  349.14  1350.00  83.00 
HG SF CDO AAA 
Whole period  482.24  428.32  424.87  1463.10  23.00 
First half of 2007  23.73  23.00  2.68  35.00  23.00 
Second half of 2007  177.88  108.09  135.50  450.90  42.00 
All of 2007  100.81  38.50  122.72  450.90  23.00 
All of 2008  830.22  849.77  275.79  1463.10  391.43 
Mezzanine SF CDO AAA 
Whole period  1094.17  1084.79  873.46  2712.79  32.00 
First half of 2007  54.38  55.00  20.99  105.00  32.00 
Second half of 2007  567.96  444.69  380.54  1084.79  115.00 
All of 2007  311.17  110.00  372.07  1084.79  32.00 
All of 2008  1808.49  1742.65  506.59  2712.79  1006.25 
Panel C: Non-US Non-Subprime Asset Classes 
Australia RMBS AAA 
Whole period  145.60  90.00  151.22  650.00  5.00 
First half of 2007  6.23  7.00  0.91  7.00  5.00 
Second half of 2007  48.15  50.00  24.66  90.00  5.00 
All of 2007  27.19  7.00  27.32  90.00  5.00 
All of 2008  257.55  200.00  133.86  650.00  90.00 
UK RMBS AAA 
Whole period  124.53  80.00  131.25  440.00  4.00 
First half of 2007  4.96  5.00  0.72  6.00  4.00 
Second half of 2007  45.15  50.00  22.23  80.00  5.00 
All of 2007  25.06  6.00  25.58  80.00  4.00 
All of 2008  218.58  180.00  121.08  440.00  80.00 
Dutch RMBS AAA 
Whole Period  56.56  50.00  42.40  170.00  10.00 
First half of 2007  10.69  11.00  0.74  12.00  10.00 
Second half of 2007  40.35  39.00  18.96  70.00  11.00 
All of 2007  25.52  12.00  20.02  70.00  10.00 
All of 2008  97.95  90.00  25.38  170.00  60.00 
UK Cards AAA 
Whole period  178.62  150.00  176.97  625.00  10.00 
First half of 2007  10.08  10.00  0.28  11.00  10.00 
Second half of 2007  44.38  40.00  25.94  90.00  11.00 
All of 2007  32.95  27.00  26.67  90.00  10.00 
All of 2008  281.91  215.00  165.05  625.00  90.00 
European Consumer Receivable  
AAA 
Whole period  206.25  200.00  176.36  600.00  15.00 
First half of 2007  15.29  15.00  0.76  17.00  15.00 
Second half of 2007  54.92  55.00  25.05  95.00  18.00 
All of 2007  46.52  50.00  27.59  95.00  15.00 
All of 2008  302.09  235.00  157.19  600.00  95.00 
European Auto AAA 
Whole period  120.57  85.00  119.56  450.00  7.00 
First half of 2007  7.14  7.00  0.38  8.00  7.00 
Second half of 2007  37.31  35.00  18.62  65.00  8.00 
All of 2007  30.91  30.00  20.68  65.00  7.00 
All of 2008  174.36  115.00  122.14  450.00  60.00 50 
 
 
Panel D: Repo Rate Spreads (bps; except repo haircuts) 
Series Periods  Mean  Median  Std.  Err.  Max  Min 
Mean of 
Haircut 
BBB+ / A Corporates 
Whole period  86.50  82.14  83.15  429.43  0.50  0.5% 
First half of 2007  2.01  1.95  0.61  5.30  0.50  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  61.85  65.49  36.29  126.35  1.70  0.0% 
All of 2007  32.28  2.70  39.53  126.35  0.50  0.0% 
All of 2008  136.19  103.63  81.61  429.43  44.33  0.9% 
AA-AAA Corporates 
Whole period  77.59  74.78  78.42  409.43  -3.50  0.5% 
First half of 2007  -1.69  -2.05  1.90  10.44  -3.50  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  55.27  58.95  34.53  116.35  -2.30  0.0% 
All of 2007  27.13  -1.35  37.64  116.35  -3.50  0.0% 
All of 2008  123.86  92.11  77.57  409.43  39.33  0.9% 
A-AAA ABS-Auto / CC 
/ SL  
Whole period  105.22  94.76  101.00  479.43  1.70  5.2% 
First half of 2007  4.44  4.00  1.77  11.00  1.70  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  68.44  71.78  40.93  141.35  3.70  0.9% 
All of 2007  36.82  5.25  43.29  141.35  1.70  0.5% 
All of 2008  167.92  119.81  98.07  479.43  54.33  9.5% 
AA-AAA ABS-RMBS / 
CMBS 
Whole period  124.04  107.78  120.11  520.30  3.70  9.4% 
First half of 2007  6.41  6.00  1.76  13.00  3.70  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  76.35  81.78  43.92  151.35  5.70  1.8% 
All of 2007  41.80  7.00  46.92  151.35  3.70  0.9% 
All of 2008  199.44  145.08  117.27  520.30  64.33  17.1% 
<AA  ABS-RMBS / 
CMBS 
Whole period  135.90  117.78  129.02  550.30  6.70  10.6% 
First half of 2007  9.41  9.00  1.76  16.00  6.70  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  84.55  88.20  48.62  166.35  8.70  3.7% 
All of 2007  47.43  10.00  51.08  166.35  6.70  1.9% 
All of 2008  217.01  153.95  125.56  550.30  69.33  18.6% 
Unpriced ABS / MBS / 
All Sub-Prime 
Whole period  108.94  109.69  84.64  295.38  7.70  37.3% 
First half of 2007  10.41  10.00  1.76  17.00  7.70  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  95.62  97.83  58.54  196.35  9.70  7.7% 
All of 2007  53.52  11.00  59.59  196.35  7.70  3.9% 
All of 2008  187.28  197.88  42.23  295.38  99.33  68.0% 
AA-AAA CLO 
Whole period  134.46  117.14  127.18  545.30  3.70  10.2% 
First half of 2007  6.41  6.00  1.76  13.00  3.70  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  85.93  92.65  51.27  171.35  5.70  1.8% 
All of 2007  46.64  7.00  53.98  171.35  3.70  0.9% 
All of 2008  214.96  148.76  121.61  545.30  79.33  18.7% 
AA-AAA CDO 
Whole period  130.09  124.69  107.46  380.38  4.70  30.0% 
First half of 2007  7.41  7.00  1.76  14.00  4.70  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  107.77  109.35  69.56  226.35  6.70  8.3% 
All of 2007  58.19  8.00  70.48  226.35  4.70  4.3% 
All of 2008  231.72  241.39  56.52  380.38  129.33  53.5% 
Unpriced CLO / CDO 
Whole period  148.32  142.60  123.54  413.75  6.70  32.4% 
First half of 2007  9.41  9.00  1.76  16.00  6.70  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  122.63  124.42  80.14  256.35  8.70  10.5% 
All of 2007  66.69  10.00  80.34  256.35  6.70  5.4% 
All of 2008  268.39  256.58  63.03  413.75  154.33  57.3% 
Repo-Rate Index and 
Repo-Haircut Index (last 
column) 
Whole period  151.36  130.89  152.79  688.10  3.81  15.1% 
First half of 2007  6.03  5.67  1.45  11.33  3.81  0.0% 
Second half of 2007  84.27  89.18  51.14  172.46  5.37  3.9% 
All of 2007  45.61  6.98  53.44  172.46  3.81  2.0% 
All of 2008  248.29  171.20  149.95  688.10  81.55  27.2% 
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Panel E: Control variables 
Series Periods  Mean  Median  Std.  Err.  Max  Min 
ABX Index (bps) 
Whole period  4090.11  3604.00  3524.76  10940.98  121.00 
First half of 2007  302.15  329.50  139.54  552.00  121.00 
Second half of 2007  1657.69  1752.00  894.91  3286.00  368.00 
All of 2007  979.92  481.50  933.01  3286.00  121.00 
All of 2008  6927.48  6938.67  2447.64  10940.98  3373.00 
10Year Treasury Rate 
Whole period  4.07%  4.04%  0.71%  5.19%  2.08% 
First half of 2007  4.77%  4.73%  0.20%  5.19%  4.51% 
Second half of 2007  4.52%  4.51%  0.32%  5.14%  3.96% 
All of 2007  4.64%  4.66%  0.29%  5.19%  3.96% 
All of 2008  3.56%  3.72%  0.56%  4.50%  2.08% 
OIS 
Whole period  3.26%  3.53%  1.79%  5.29%  0.18% 
First half of 2007  5.28%  5.28%  0.01%  5.29%  5.26% 
Second half of 2007  4.65%  4.60%  0.42%  5.28%  4.07% 
All of 2007  4.96%  5.27%  0.43%  5.29%  4.07% 
All of 2008  1.70%  2.00%  0.94%  3.96%  0.18% 
Return of S&P 500 
Whole period  -0.40%  0.20%  3.83%  17.97%  -18.34% 
First half of 2007  0.25%  0.18%  1.45%  3.04%  -3.65% 
Second half of 2007  -0.06%  0.01%  2.02%  3.74%  -4.53% 
All of 2007  0.09%  0.18%  1.75%  3.74%  -4.53% 
All of 2008  -0.85%  0.22%  4.98%  17.97%  -18.34% 
VIX 
Whole period  25.94  22.49  14.93  80.86  10.18 
First half of 2007  13.05  13.07  1.97  17.06  10.18 
Second half of 2007  21.88  21.2  4.02  30.83  15.23 
All of 2007  17.47  15.68  5.45  30.83  10.18 
All of 2008  33.68  25.59  16.59  80.86  16.3 
Slope of Yield Curve 
Whole period  1.01%  1.22%  0.78%  2.62%  -0.13% 
First half of 2007  -0.02%  -0.04%  0.09%  0.22%  -0.13% 
Second half of 2007  0.59%  0.55%  0.31%  1.39%  0.17% 
All of 2007  0.29%  0.18%  0.38%  1.39%  -0.13% 
All of 2008  1.66%  1.57%  0.34%  2.62%  1.08% 
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Table III 
Credit Spreads Regression Results 
For each bond i, we estimate equation (2) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009, ∆LIB-OIS is 
the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS). ∆ABX is 
the parentage change of the ABX index at period t. ∆OIS is the Overnight Index Swap. ∆r-10 is the change in yield 
on the 10-year Treasury, with its square given by (∆r-10)^2.  ∆Slope is the change in 10-year minus 2-year Treasury 
yields. ∆VIX is the change in implied volatility of S&P 500, and ∆S&P is the return on S&P 500. t-statistics are 
given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The last two rows report F-statistics and p-values for the key 
state variables. The null hypothesis of the LIB-OIS F-Test is that the sum of all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS and its 
lags is zero. The null hypothesis of the ABX F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of ∆ABX and its lags is zero. Panel 
A shows the results of six U.S. non-subprime assets and Panel B shows the results of six non-US non-subprime 
assets. 
 
Panel A: U.S. Non-Subprime Asset Classes  
   Credit Spreads  
   Cards  Auto   Student  CMBS 
HG SF 
CDO 
Mezz SF 
CDO 
Intercept  0.003 0.016 -0.010 0.036 0.042 0.052 
  (0.1)  (0.33) (-0.33) (2.41) (2.86) (3.96) 
∆LIB-OIS 0.341 0.079 0.461 0.025  -0.051  -0.037 
 (3.24)  (0.54)  (5.23)  (0.26)  (-1.16)  (-0.94) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-1  0.264  0.486  0.131  0.078  -0.042  0.055 
 (2.64)  (3.55)  (1.59)  (0.84)  (-1.00)  (1.45) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-2  0.132  0.012  0.138  -0.082  0.038  -0.081 
 (1.32)  (0.08)  (1.67)  (-0.92)  (0.91)  (-2.15) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-3  0.027  0.170  -0.013 -0.030 -0.030 -0.004 
 (0.27)  (1.25)  (-0.16)  (-0.33)  (-0.72)  (-0.1) 
∆ABX  -0.141 -0.331 0.455 0.012 0.001 0.070 
  (-0.66) (-1.13) (2.32) (0.27) (0.00) (0.86) 
∆ABX, t-1  0.079  -0.025  0.119  -0.013  0.016  0.061 
 (0.36)  (-0.09)  (0.6)  (-0.32)  (0.18)  (0.74) 
∆ABX,  t-2  0.315  0.250  -0.202 -0.072 -0.020 -0.040 
 (1.48)  (0.86)  (-1.06)  (-1.71)  (-0.23)  (-0.5) 
∆ABX, t-3  -0.277  -0.351  -0.150  -0.052  0.049  -0.011 
 (-1.3)  (-1.2)  (-0.69)  (-1.24)  (0.54)  (-0.14) 
∆OIS -0.253  -0.147  -0.358  -0.096  0.156  0.106 
  (-0.78) (-0.33) (-1.34) (-0.69) (1.14) (0.85) 
∆r-10  0.111  -0.092  0.059  -0.214 -0.227 -0.132 
  (0.58)  (-0.36)  (0.36)  (-2.65) (-2.87) (-1.85) 
(∆r-10)^2  0.174  0.076  0.037  -0.042 -0.094 -0.144 
  (0.57)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (-0.33) (-0.75) (-1.26) 
∆S&P -0.443  1.518  -0.757  -1.622  -0.580  0.592 
 (-0.29)  (0.7)  (-0.57)  (-2.42)  (-0.89)  (0.99) 
∆VIX  -0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006 
  (-0.5)  (0.23) (-0.29) (0.56) (0.41) (1.26) 
∆Slope  -0.155 0.189 -0.039 0.298 0.269 0.075 
  (-0.74) (0.64) (-0.23) (3.29) (3.02) (0.92) 
LIB-OIS F-test  20.16  10.26  26.13 2.99 1.38 1.08 
(<0.01)  (<0.01)  (<0.01) (0.08) (0.24) (0.30) 
ABX F-test  0.00 0.73 0.42 0.00 0.08 0.39 
(0.95) (0.40) (0.52) (0.95) (0.78) (0.59) 
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   Panel B: Non-US Non-Subprime Asset Classes 
  Credit Spreads  
  
Australia 
RMBS UK  RMBS 
Dutch 
RMBS UK  Cards 
European 
Consumer 
Receivable 
European 
Auto  
Intercept  0.014  0.017 0.014 0.031  0.032  0.037 
 (0.52)  (0.93)  (1.14)  (2.4)  (3.21)  (2.35) 
∆LIB-OIS  0.126  0.240 0.100 0.109  0.049  0.081 
  (1.57)  (4.38) (2.71) (2.86)  (1.76)  (1.8) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-1  0.575  0.237 0.071 0.136  0.021  0.019 
  (7.56)  (4.57) (2.11) (3.72)  (0.8)  (0.45) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-2  -0.181  -0.051  0.115  0.019  0.033  0.104 
 (-2.44)  (-1.01)  (3.42)  (0.52)  (1.26)  (2.51) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-3  0.138  0.067  -0.015  -0.019  0.020  0.022 
 (1.86)  (1.32)  (-0.47)  (-0.55)  (0.77)  (0.53) 
∆ABX 0.025  0.029 0.095 0.094  0.116  0.095 
  (0.15)  (0.26) (1.37) (1.03)  (1.65)  (0.84) 
∆ABX,  t-1  -0.002  0.022 0.002 0.028  0.001  -0.010 
  (-0.02)  (0.19) (0.03) (0.34)  (0.01)  (-0.09) 
∆ABX, t-2  -0.171  -0.018  -0.037  0.011  0.037  0.044 
 (-1.09)  (-0.17)  (-0.54)  (0.13)  (0.54)  (0.4) 
∆ABX, t-3  0.173  0.072  -0.109  -0.084  -0.060  -0.265 
 (1.09)  (0.66)  (-1.6)  (-1.05)  (-0.9)  (-2.47) 
∆OIS  0.034  -0.031 -0.237 -0.051  -0.054  -0.164 
  (0.1) (-0.15) (-0.63) (-0.33)  (-0.48)  (-0.91) 
∆r-10 -0.207  -0.140  -0.067 -0.134  -0.106  -0.146 
  (-1.36)  (-1.34) (-0.81) (-1.84)  (-1.97)  (-1.71) 
(∆r-10)^2  0.194  -0.022 -0.058 -0.036  -0.096  -0.018 
 (0.85)  (-0.15)  (-0.5)  (-0.34)  (-1.23)  (-0.15) 
∆S&P -0.915  -0.272 -0.709 0.164  0.194  0.695 
 (-0.76)  (-0.33)  (-0.86)  (0.28)  (0.45)  (1.01) 
∆VIX -0.006  -0.001  -0.002 0.000  0.001  0.003 
 (-0.64)  (-0.11)  (-0.31)  (0.07)  (0.39)  (0.6) 
∆Slope 0.179  0.077 0.051 0.133  0.091  0.190 
  (1.05)  (0.66) (0.51) (1.64)  (1.53)  (2) 
LIB-OIS    25.57  30.71 20.89 14.40  6.56  8.62 
F-test  (<0.01)  (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)  (0.01)  (<0.01) 
ABX    0.01  0.28  0.14  0.09  0.51  0.41 
F-test (0.93)  (0.60) (0.71) (0.77)  (0.48)  (0.52) 
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Table IV 
Summary of F-Test Results for Different Asset Categories 
For each bond i, we estimate equation (2) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009, ∆LIB-OIS is 
the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS). This table 
summarizes the F-test results for the LIB-OIS state variable and its lags. The null hypothesis of F-test is the sum of 
all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS and its lags is zero. The numbers in the table indicate how many F-tests of bonds in 
each category are significant at various confidence levels. Asset categories are listed in Panel A of Table I. 
“Negative” and “Positive” indicate the sign of the sum of coefficients for ∆LIB-OIS and its lags.    
Panel A: Whole Period: January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009 
      Negative  Positive 
Categories  Total  Number  10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
Subprime  63  1 1  0 2 1  2 
Nonsubprime_US  176  3 0  0 4 7  106 
Nonsubprime_Europe  59  0 0  0 0 6  39 
Financial  46  0 0  0 3 2  6 
Industrial  48  0 0  0 5  14  9 
Total 392  4  1  0  14  30  162 
Panel B: Subperiod I: January 4, 2007 to December 27, 2007 
      Negative  Positive 
Categories  Total  Number  10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
Subprime  63  2 4  2 0 2  1 
Nonsubprime_US  176  4 0  1 8  21  75 
Nonsubprime_Europe  59  0 0  0 5  10  24 
Financial  46  3 1  0 1 2  1 
Industrial  48  0 0  0 0 1  4 
Total 392  9  5  3  14  36  105 
Panel C: Subperiod II: January 3, 2008 to January 29,2009 
      Negative  Positive 
Categories  Total  Number  10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
Subprime  63  1 0  0 0 0  0 
Nonsubprime_US 176  8  0  0  23  26  41 
Nonsubprime_Europe  59  0 0  0 0 1  0 
Financial  46  0 0  0 6  10  6 
Industrial  48  0 0  0 6 9  21 
Total 392  9  0  0  35  46  68 
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 Table V 
Summary of F-Test Results for Different Rating Classes 
For each bond i, we estimate equation (2) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009, ∆LIB-OIS is 
the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS).This table 
summarizes the F-test results for the LIB-OIS state variable and its lags. The null hypothesis of F-test is the sum of 
all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS and its lags is zero. The numbers in the table indicate how many F-tests of bonds in 
each rating class are significant at various confidence levels. “Negative” and “Positive” indicate the sign of the sum 
of the coefficients for ∆LIB-OIS and its lags.    
Panel A: Whole Period: January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009 
      Negative  Positive 
Rating  Total  Number  10% 5%  1% 10% 5% 1% 
AAA 157 4  0  0  4  10  83 
AA  47  0 1  0 1 3  9 
A  74  0 0  0 3 5  33 
BBB  83  0 0  0 2 6  36 
Other  31  0 0  0 4 6  1 
Total 392 4  1  0  14  30  162 
Panel B: Subperiod I: January 4, 2007 to December 27, 2007 
      Negative  Positive 
Rating  Total  Number  10% 5%  1% 10% 5% 1% 
AAA 157 5  1  1  9  25  47 
AA  47  0 0  1 0 1  7 
A  74  0 2  0 3 4  27 
BBB  83  1 1  0 1 5  23 
Other  31  3 1  1 1 1  1 
Total 392 9  5  3  14  36  105 
Panel C: Subperiod II: January 3, 2008 to January 29,2 009 
      Negative  Positive 
Rating  Total  Number  10% 5%  1% 10% 5% 1% 
AAA 157 0  0  0  4  13  44 
AA 47  1  0  0  3  12  4 
A 74  4  0  0  14  9  5 
BBB 83  4  0  0  9  11  5 
Other  31  0 0  0 5 1  10 
Total 392 9  0  0  35  46  68 
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Table VI  
Repo Spreads Regression Results 
For each class of securitized bonds, we estimate equation (3) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 
2009. ∆LIB-OIS is the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap 
(OIS). ∆ABX is the parentage change of the ABX index at period t. ∆OIS is the Overnight Index Swap. ∆r-10 is the 
change in yield on the 10-year Treasury, with its square given by (∆r-10)^2.  ∆Slope is the change in 10-year minus 
2-year Treasury yields. ∆VIX is the change in implied volatility of S&P 500, and ∆S&P is the return on S&P 500. t-
statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The last two rows report F-statistics and p-values 
for the key state variables. The null hypothesis of the LIB-OIS F-Test is that the sum of all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS 
and its lags is zero. The null hypothesis of the ABX F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of ∆ABX and its lags is 
zero. The null hypothesis of the VOL F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of VOL and its lags is zero. 
   Repo Rate Spreads 
  
A-AAA ABS-
Auto / CC / SL 
<AA  ABS-
RMBS / CMBS 
AA-AAA ABS-
RMBS / CMBS  AA-AAA CLO   AA-AAA CDO 
Intercept  0.035 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.024 
  (0.86) (0.89) (0.71) (0.71) (0.93) 
∆LIB-OIS  1.321 0.825 1.043 1.025 0.558 
  (12)  (17.26) (16.45) (15.66)  (7.26) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-1  -0.168 -0.004 -0.056 -0.068 0.044 
 (-1.58)  (-0.1)  (-0.93)  (-1.08)  (0.67) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-2  0.084 0.071 0.099 0.115 0.062 
  (0.8)  (1.57) (1.65) (1.85) (0.85) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-3  -0.134 0.004 -0.040 -0.021 0.010 
  (-1.27) (0.09) (-0.66) (-0.35) (0.15) 
∆ABX -0.188 -0.152 -0.169 -0.183 -0.031 
  (-0.86) (-1.59) (-1.32)  (-1.4)  (-0.23) 
∆ABX,  t-1  0.227 0.020 0.072 0.076 0.206 
  (1.03) (0.21) (0.57) (0.58)  (1.5) 
∆ABX,  t-2  0.435 0.007 0.092 0.086 0.037 
  (1.99) (0.07) (0.73) (0.66) (0.28) 
∆ABX,  t-3  0.018 0.064 0.057 0.085 0.052 
    (0.08) (0.67) (0.44) (0.66) (0.38) 
∆VOL  -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.32) (0.15) (0.42) (0.25) (0.25) 
∆VOL,  t-1  0.000  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.03)  (-0.35)  (-0.73)  (-0.6)  (-0.84) 
∆VOL,  t-2  -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (-0.32) (0.76) (0.98) (0.45) (0.26) 
∆VOL,  t-3  0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.18)  (-0.78)  (-1.19)  (-1.3)  (0.8) 
∆OIS  0.060 -0.044 -0.078 -0.005 0.184 
  (0.11) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.01) (0.21) 
∆r-10 0.085 0.023 0.085 0.028 0.142 
  (0.4)  (0.27) (0.73) (0.23) (0.79) 
(∆r-10)^2  -0.178 -0.019 0.010 0.019 -0.082 
  (-0.52) (-0.13) (0.05) (0.09) (-0.35) 
∆S&P -0.374 0.136 -0.158 0.430 -2.373 
  (-0.21) (0.17) (-0.15) (0.39) (-1.38) 
∆VIX 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000 
  (0.29) (-0.01) (0.09) (0.64) (-0.01) 
∆Slope -0.218 -0.080 -0.122 -0.027 -0.196 
  (-0.98) (-0.81) (-0.92)  (-0.2)  (-0.99) 
LIB-OIS F-Test  32.56 129.61  100.87 96.07  30.37 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
ABX F-Test  1.44 0.12 0.05 0.07 1.07 
(0.23) (0.73) (0.82) (0.79)  (0.3) 
VOL F-Test  0.53 0.01 0.34 1.80 0.14 
(0.47) (0.93) (0.56) (0.18) (0.71) 57 
 
 
Table VII   
Haircut Regression Results  
For each class of securitized bonds, we estimate equation (7) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 
2009, ∆LIB-OIS is the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap 
(OIS). ∆ABX is the parentage change of the ABX index at period t. ∆OIS is the Overnight Index Swap. ∆r-10 is the 
change in yield on the 10-year Treasury, with its square given by (∆r-10)^2.  ∆Slope is the change in 10-year minus 
2-year Treasury yields. ∆VIX is the change in implied volatility of S&P 500, and ∆S&P is the return on S&P 500. t-
statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The last two rows report F-statistics and p-values 
for the key state variables. The null hypothesis of the LIB-OIS F-Test is that the sum of all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS 
and its lags is zero. The null hypothesis of the ABX F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of ∆ABX and its lags is 
zero. The null hypothesis of the VOL F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of VOL and its lags is zero. 
Haircut Regression with Lags 
   Change of Haircuts 
  
A-AAA ABS-
Auto / CC / SL 
<AA  ABS-
RMBS / CMBS 
AA-AAA ABS-
RMBS / CMBS  AA-AAA CDO  AA-AAA CLO 
Intercept 0.00096 0.00266 0.00194 -0.00514 0.00311 
  (0.69) (1.19) (1.08) (-0.34) (1.59) 
∆LIB-OIS  -0.00010 0.00009 0.00010 0.00121 0.00003 
  (-1.44) (0.89) (1.25) (0.85) (0.27) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-1  -0.00010 0.00001 -0.00002 0.00079 0.00008 
  (-1.53) (0.07) (-0.24) (0.55) (0.67) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-2  0.00005 0.00008 0.00011 -0.00053  -0.00016 
  (0.75) (0.75) (1.31) (-0.41)  (-1.45) 
∆LIB-OIS,  t-3  -0.00001 -0.00014 -0.00010 0.00073  0.00006 
 (-0.12)  (-1.2)  (-1.18)  (0.62)  (0.74) 
∆ABX  0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 0.00004 0.00000 
  (1.05) (0.33) (1.19) (0.69) (-0.34) 
∆ABX,  t-1  0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 
 (0.06)  (-1.05)  (-0.64)  (0.2)  (0.18) 
∆ABX,  t-2  0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 
  (0.12) (0.67) (0.86) (0.32) (0.43) 
∆ABX,  t-3  0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00003 -0.00001 
    (-0.79) (-1.4) (-1.58) (0.44) (-1.34) 
∆VOL  0.00036 0.00001 0.00000 0.00311 0.00015 
  (2.31) (0.52) (-0.06) (3.19) (2.05) 
∆VOL,  t-1  -0.00049 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00345 0.00000 
  (-2.01) (-0.24) (-0.12) (-2.37) (0.04) 
∆VOL,  t-2  0.00049 0.00002 0.00003 0.00235 -0.00016 
  (2.09) (0.36) (0.34) (1.57) (-1.61) 
∆VOL,  t-3  -0.00005 -0.00001 -0.00004 0.00006  0.00017 
  (-0.28) (-0.52) (-0.69) (0.05)  (1.99) 
∆OIS  0.00476 -0.01801 -0.01655 -0.09061 -0.01967 
  (0.4)  (-0.92) (-1.02) (-0.67)  (-1.2) 
∆r-10  0.00413 -0.01072 -0.00689 0.04610 0.00241 
 (0.6)  (-1.02)  (-0.82)  (0.51)  (0.26) 
(∆r-10)^2 0.00703 -0.00617 -0.00882 -0.13209 -0.00100 
  (0.64) (-0.36) (-0.62) (-0.97) (-0.06) 
∆S&P  0.03663 -0.02488 -0.06200 0.07360 -0.00699 
  (0.66) (-0.28) (-0.89) (0.09) (-0.09) 
∆VIX  0.00037 -0.00014 -0.00042 0.00098 -0.00074 
  (0.77) (-0.18) (-0.68) (0.14) (-1.07) 
∆Slope 0.01253 0.01069 0.00682 -0.07066  -0.00906 
  (1.63) (0.85) (0.67) (-0.7) (-0.85) 
LIB-OIS F-Test 
1.47 0.06 0.69 0.89 0.01 
(0.23) (0.81) (0.41) (0.35) (0.91) 
ABX F-Test 
0.05 0.58 0.01 0.64 0.32 
(0.83) (0.45) (0.92) (0.43) (0.57) 
VOL F-Test  4.66 0.07 0.29 5.33 5.53 
(0.03) (0.80) (0.60) (0.02) (0.02) 58 
 
 
 